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DIRECT TYRANNY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AS A 
SAFEGUARD AGAINST HARMFUL MAJORITARIANISM IN 
JACKSON V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND 
ETHICS 
Lauren E. Repole* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The history of direct democracy in America reveals great 
tensions between public initiatives, individual liberties, majoritarian 
campaigns, and the accountability of public officials to the electorate 
as a whole.1  Though the initiative process certainly can be a method 
through which voters are able to voice valid frustrations with 
representative government and achieve reform, the process of direct 
democracy has long been feared as a threat to minority rights.2  
Direct democratic processes are antithetical to American 
governmental institutions.3  American government is founded upon a 
healthy mistrust of majorities,4 and, as James Madison long ago 
concluded, men are not angels.5  Direct democracy, generally, and 
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, 
Rutgers University.  Thank you to Professor Marc R. Poirier for his tremendous 
intellect and guidance.  I would also like to thank my parents for their constant and 
limitless support. 
 1  See Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 105 (D.C. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).  Woodrow Wilson reasoned that the initiative and 
referendum were proposed “as a means of bringing our representatives back to the 
consciousness that what they are bound in duty and in mere policy to do is to 
represent the sovereign people who they profess to serve and not the private interests 
which creep into their counsels by way of machine orders and committee 
conferences.”  John G. Matsusaka, Disentangling the Direct and Indirect Effects of 
the Initiative Process 3–4 (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Papers/Matsusaka_Direct 
_vs_Indirect_2007.pdf (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The Issues in Reform, in THE 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL XX, 87–88 (William Bennett Munro ed., 1912)). 
 2  See William E. Adams, Jr., Is It Animus or a Difference of Opinion?  The Problems 
Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 
449–50 (1998). 
 3  Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 
294 (2010).  
 4  Id. at 295. 
 5  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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the ballot initiative, specifically, pose serious threats to vulnerable 
minorities in part because the process of adoption is devoid of the 
checks and balances that are integral to representative democracy.6  
Jurisdictions, therefore, must adopt proper safeguards to ensure that 
minorities are protected from majoritarian campaigns. 
Ballot initiatives in recent years have focused on the legality of 
same-sex marriages, and this focus serves as an example of how 
jurisdictions can use the initiative process to limit the rights of a 
vulnerable sector of the general population.7  In the recent District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals decision Jackson v. District of Columbia 
Board of Elections and Ethics, the court upheld the D.C. Board of 
Elections and Ethics’ rejection of the “Marriage Initiative of 2009.”8  
This decision exemplifies how safeguards can temper the most 
deleterious effects of the initiative process, ensuring that it is not used 
to promote discrimination, while allowing for a process of public-
initiated reform.  Moreover, given the current pervasive use of ballot 
measures to legislate social issues such as same-sex marriage,9 the 
need for reform to limit the use of direct democracy is substantial.  
This Comment will argue the need for reform in the use of the ballot 
initiative to protect minority rights by adopting safeguards so that 
human rights measures cannot be put to the ballot. 
This Comment will survey the origin and use of direct 
democracy in this country.  Most significantly, this Comment will 
emphasize the need to adopt safeguards to ensure the protection of 
the rights of vulnerable minorities, generally, and gays and lesbians, 
specifically.  In Part II, this Comment will briefly describe the 
processes comprising direct democracy.  Part II will also survey the 
history of direct legislation in this country, the current use of the 
initiative in jurisdictions across the nation, and some of the criticisms 
and defenses of the initiative process, focusing on the criticism that 
initiatives can unduly target vulnerable minorities.  Part III will 
address two of the many important recent cases, Strauss v. Horton10 
and Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics.11  This 
 
 6  See David B. Magleby, Governing by Initiative: Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment 
of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 45 (1995). 
 7  See Adam H. Morse, Second-Class Citizenship: The Tension Between the Supremacy of 
the People and Minority Rights, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 963–64 (2010).   
 8  Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89 (D.C. 2010). 
 9  See Nate Silver, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES (June 
29, 2011), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/the-future-of-same 
-sex-marriage-ballot-measures/. 
 10  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 11  Jackson, 999 A.2d 89. 
REPOLE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2013  12:26 PM 
2013] COMMENT 687 
Comment proposes that the District of Columbia Council’s (“the 
Council”) 1978 adoption of the Human Rights Act12 in conjunction 
with the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendment Act 
(“CAA”)13 properly addresses the Council’s legitimate concern that an 
unchecked initiative process can deleteriously impact the liberties of 
disfavored minorities.  The outcome of this case stands in stark 
contrast to Strauss v. Horton,14 in which the California Supreme Court 
upheld Proposition 8, an initiative limiting the rights of same-sex 
couples.15  Part III then highlights Justice Moreno’s dissent in Strauss, 
which echoes the concerns of the District of Columbia Council in 
adopting the Human Rights Act safeguard (“Human Rights 
Safeguard”).16 
Part IV will consider methods by which various jurisdictions have 
placed limits on direct democracy initiatives.  Part V will provide a 
theoretical and practical argument for the need for safeguards 
against unchecked direct democracy, further arguing that the District 
of Columbia’s use of the Human Rights Safeguard is effective to 
combat the potential threat of harmful majoritarianism while 
allowing the electorate to continue to participate in the initiative 
process.  Part VI will conclude by reaffirming the need for reform to 
protect minorities from the adoption of ballot initiatives that curtail 
minority rights.  Though an outlier in practice, the Human Rights 
Safeguard, which the District of Columbia uses, is important to the 
discussion of how direct democratic methods can work in a 
democratic republic, and ought to be considered in other 
jurisdictions that offer the right to the direct initiative.17 
 
 12  D.C. CODE § 2-1401 (West 2007) 
 13  D.C. CODE § 1-204.101–07 (West 2001). 
 14  Strauss, 207 P.3d 48. 
 15  Id.  As discussed in greater detail infra note 144, the United States Court of 
Appeals recently concluded that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional.  Perry v. Brown, 
671 F.3d (9th Cir. 2012) (formerly Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 
(N.D. Cal. 2010)).  That ruling, while significant, does not affect the central 
argument in this Comment.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
 16  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 17  This Comment is not an assessment of the overall value of direct democratic 
processes in the United States.  There certainly are positive aspects of direct 
democracy.  Prior scholarly writings have contributed to the discussion of direct 
democracy, and many scholars have addressed various issues related to the initiative 
and referendum process in this country.  These writings include the arguments that 
courts should: use the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and 
shall protect each of them against invasion . . . .”), to nullify ballot initiatives that 
threaten minority rights; analyze popular measures under the scope of the 
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II.  THE HISTORY OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
Before discussing the current need for reform in the use of the 
ballot initiative to protect minority rights, it is helpful to examine the 
origins of direct democracy in the United States.  First, this Part will 
define the processes entailing direct democracy.18  It then will survey 
the origins of direct democracy, highlighting the goals of the Populist 
and Progressive Movements, and discuss the modern era of direct 
democracy beginning in the late 1970s.19  This Part will conclude by 
briefly putting forth many contemporary criticisms of direct 
democracy in general, and the direct initiative specifically, paying 
particular attention to the concern that the direct initiative poses a 
threat to minority rights.20 
A.  Direct Democracy Defined 
David V. Magleby, an esteemed scholar in the area of direct 
democracy, defines direct legislation as “the process by which voters 
directly decide issues of public policy by voting on ballot 
propositions.”21  Julian N. Eule divides direct democracy into two 
primary subgroups: substitutive and complementary.22  First, in 
substitutive direct democracy, the electorate can completely bypass all 
branches of government, thereby substituting direct, popular 
lawmaking for the traditional, representative lawmaking process.23  
The ballot initiative, or plebiscite, is the ordinary form of substitutive 
 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; and 
develop consistent standards with which to evaluate the ballot initiatives.  See, e.g., 
Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause 
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994); Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: 
Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1 (1997).  Moreover, in the aftermath of the Strauss decision and responding 
to Justice Moreno’s warnings, Anne Marie Smith has utilized political and 
constitutional theory to propose a revised initiative procedure that would not 
threaten minority rights.  Anna Marie Smith, The Paradoxes of Popular 
Constitutionalism: Proposition 8 and Strauss v. Horton, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 517, 545 
(2011).  For a thorough discussion of many issues that scholars have discussed 
relating to the direct democracy debate, see generally Linda Maduz, Direct Democracy, 2 
LIVING REVIEWS IN DEMOCRACY 1 (2010), available at 
http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/view/lrd-2010-1/21.  
 18  See infra Part II.A. 
 19  See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 20  See infra Part II.D. 
 21  DAVID V. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (1984).   
 22  Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510 
(1990). 
 23  Id. 
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direct democracy, allowing for “voters to propose a legislative 
measure (statutory initiative) or a constitutional amendment 
(constitutional initiative) by filing a petition bearing a required 
number of valid citizen signatures.”24 
The ballot initiative can be further subdivided as either a direct 
or indirect initiative.25  A direct initiative is a constitutional 
amendment and/or statute “proposed by petition and submitted 
directly to the voters for approval or rejection without any action by 
the legislature.”26  Jurisdictions that allow for direct initiative vary as to 
whether the electorate can put forth a statutory initiative, a 
constitutional amendment by initiative, or both.27  Upon approval by 
the electorate, the proposal has the full force and effect of a state 
constitutional amendment or statute.28  An indirect initiative is 
proposed by petition, which is first submitted to the state legislature 
for approval.29  If the legislature fails to act on the proposal or if it 
amends the original proposal in a manner unacceptable to the 
proponents, the proponents may submit their original initiative to be 
placed on the ballot for a vote of the entire electorate.30  Some states 
that permit indirect initiatives allow their legislatures, in the 
circumstances in which a legislature does not approve the submitted 
indirect initiative, to offer a substitute initiative on the same issue to 
be accompanied by the original on the ballot.31  Eule characterizes an 
indirect initiative that the legislature adopts as a product of 
representative democracy and describes an initiative rejected by the 
legislature but ultimately voted on and adopted by the electorate as a 
product of direct substitutive democracy.32 
Complementary direct democracy is most commonly known as 
the referendum.33  The referendum, in contrast to the initiative, 
“refers a proposed or existing law or statute to voters for their 
approval or rejection.”34  The electorate and legislature act in concert 
 
 24  THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM AND RECALL 2 (1989). 
 25  Eule, supra note 22, at 1511. 
 26  MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at 35.  
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. at 36. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Eule, supra note 22, at 1511. 
 33  Id. at 1512. 
 34  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 2. 
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in order to ratify a measure.35  There are three types of referenda: the 
mandatory or compulsory referendum, the voluntary referendum, 
and the popular referendum.36  The mandatory or compulsory 
referendum refers to a state constitutional provision that requires 
submitting certain legislative enactments to the electorate for 
ratification.37  The voluntary referendum, on the other hand, gives 
the legislature the option to refer a legislative measure to the 
electorate.38  Finally, under the popular referendum, the legislature 
enacts a measure and refers it to the electorate before the measure 
can go into effect.39 
The recall is a third method typically grouped within the 
overarching category of direct democracy.40  Through the use of the 
recall, the electorate may remove or discharge public officials by 
submitting a petition with the required number of signatures 
proposing the removal or discharge.41  The entire electorate then has 
the opportunity to vote on the continued tenure of the elected 
official.42  Though this Comment will only address the direct 
initiative, the recall has recently been implicated in the same-sex 
marriage debate.43 
 
 35  Eule, supra note 22, at 1512. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id.  As will be discussed in more detail below, infra note 379, at the time of this 
writing, New Jersey’s use of the referendum was front-page news.  See Patrick Murray, 
Trenton’s Referendum Mania, POLITICKERNJ (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.politickernj 
.com/patrick-murray/54760/trentons-referendum-mania.  Governor Chris Christie 
and some members of the legislature called for referenda on important issues, 
including same-sex marriage.  Id.  These public officials have called for a public vote 
via referendum as a means to defeat the proposal where the legislature was posed to 
pass it.  Id.  Murray warns that the referendum process leaves pressing policy issues to 
the public, who “lacks both access to information and the ability to deliberate . . . 
which our founders specifically said should be left to an informed, deliberative 
system of representative government,” concluding that “you don’t put civil rights to a 
public vote.”  Id.  
 39  Eule, supra note 22, at 1512. 
 40  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 2. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  While this Comment will not specifically focus on the recall, the recall is 
nonetheless important to the discussion of direct democracy as it relates to minority 
rights, particularly to same-sex marriage debate.  Its relevance is evidenced by the 
unprecedented recall of Iowa Supreme Court justices who were part of a unanimous 
decision to legalize same sex marriage in Iowa.  Critics of the removal raise the same 
concerns addressed in this article about the implication of these popular methods on 
minority rights.  See A.J. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics 
/04judges.html. 
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In the United States, the ballot-initiative process is used far more 
frequently than the referendum, and is generally considered to be 
more important and powerful than the referendum process.44  
Moreover, as the direct initiative allows the voters to completely 
bypass the representative democratic process, the proponents of an 
initiative are able to affect common governance without the filters 
and checks and balances constructed within the state constitutions 
and the U.S. Constitution to protect against the will of the majority.45  
This Comment will therefore focus on the substitutive form of direct 
democracy, the direct initiative. 
B.  The Development and Adoption of Direct Democracy from the 
Populist and Progressive Movements 
As Thomas E. Cronin described, “[t]he initiative, referendum, 
and recall were born in an era of real grievances.”46  In the early 
twentieth century, Populist and, subsequently, Progressive reformers 
proposed the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall as 
antidotes to “corrupt and unresponsive state legislatures.”47  The 
genesis of direct democracy in this country is largely attributed to the 
Populists.48  In 1885, two men from very different parts of the country 
became the first reformers to propose the initiative and 
referendum.49  Father W. Haire, a labor activist from Aberdeen, South 
Dakota, and Benjamin Urner, a newspaper publisher and 
unsuccessful Greenback Party congressional candidate from 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, began a movement for direct democracy that 
would soon garner serious attention throughout the country.50 
Prominent from 1875 to 1895, the People’s, or Populist, Party 
emerged from the nonpartisan Farmers’ Alliance, a group organized 
to ameliorate the impoverished conditions of the American farmer as 
well as the ills of the country as a whole, such as greedy capitalists and 
political corruption, which they believed to be the cause of the 
 
 44  INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVE 
PROCESSES 2, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop 
%20Down%20Boxes/Requirements/A%20Comparison%20of%20Statewide%20I&R
%20Processes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 45  See Eule, supra note 22, at 1525. 
 46  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 6. 
 47  Id. at 1. 
 48  DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 5–
10 (1989). 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. at 5–10. 
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farmer’s misfortune.51  Promoters of the Populist form of democracy 
argued that direct democracy reforms would benefit the public at 
large.52  Some of their selling points included that initiatives would 
promote government responsiveness and accountability and that 
initiatives were less susceptible to corruption and the influence of 
special interests than the legislatures.53  Moreover, Populists proposed 
that initiatives would promote educated discourse among the 
populous and that direct democracy would lead to a more active, less 
apathetic electorate.54  Initiatives could be used to address the tough 
issues that risk-averse elected officials shirk.55  Reformers believed that 
the general public would not be as corrupt as the legislatures.56 
The farmers’ groups, joined by other labor groups, began 
organizing by rallying around their common plights.57  The Populists 
held their first national convention in July 1892.58  The first major 
success of the direct democracy movement came from the “Populist 
strongholds of the midwestern farmlands,”59 as the movement for 
direct democracy or direct legislation gained credibility in the late 
1890s throughout the West.60  In 1898, South Dakota was the first 
state to adopt the initiative and referendum.61  Yet, despite successes 
in a few states, Populism never became a permanent or majority 
party.62  The Populist’s campaign for direct democracy reached no 
further than Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah.63 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Progressives took over the 
direct democracy campaign first fostered by the Populists.64  The 
Progressives’ stance against representative democracy was founded 
upon several beliefs: they distrusted the influence of party bosses and 
special interests, believed that the legislative process should be more 
transparent, and reasoned that public officials represented party 
 
 51  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 43–44. 
 52  Id. at 11. 
 53  Id.  
 54  Id.  
 55  Id.  
 56  PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS, 
AND COMPARISONS 17 (1998). 
 57  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 45. 
 58  Id. 
 59  SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 7. 
 60  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 50. 
 61  Id. at 51 tbl.3.1. 
 62  MATHEW MANWELLER, THE PEOPLE VERSUS THE COURTS: INITIATIVE ELITES, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 24 (2005). 
 63  Id. 
 64  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 56. 
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machinery, not the public interest.65  The Progressives, though less 
radical than their Populist predecessors, sought reforms to 
ameliorate their concerns about government corruption, and 
continued the agitational role that the Populists originated.66  
Progressivism, at its core, was a movement to “restore popular control 
of government and the Constitution” by making governmental actors 
more accountable to the people.67  Progressives pushed their direct 
democracy agenda by proposing such measures as popular election of 
U.S. senators, primary elections, the referendum, the recall, and the 
initiative.68 
Academic scholars have criticized the Progressives’ political 
aspirations to rid governance from the sway of special interests and to 
manifest popular sentiment through the policymaking process.69  
Some scholars highlight the irony embedded in the Progressives’ 
motivation to eliminate the legislation of special interests, as the 
Progressives themselves were an interest group, while others criticize 
the Progressives for being too idealistic and for discounting the 
economic realities of the modern era of industrialization.70  Still other 
scholars have discounted the Progressives’ criticism of representative 
democracy and state legislatures as exaggerated and have criticized 
the movement, arguing that the way to instill faith in the legislative 
process is to reform the process and the legislature, not to bypass it 
entirely.71 
This spotlight on the imperfections of representative democracy 
at the turn of the twentieth century may be, in part, attributable to 
the increased responsibility of state legislatures for economic and 
public policy at the time of industrialization.  During this era, state 
legislatures increasingly faced issues about social welfare, banks, 
railroads, mining and lumber interests, and land speculators.72  The 
post-Civil War era marked the beginning of the modern age of 
complex governmental regulation.73  The role of government in 
everyday life changed qualitatively and quantitatively, and public 
 
 65  Id. 
 66  MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 24.  
 67  LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 215 (2004). 
 68  Id.  
 69  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 57–58; see also MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25. 
 70  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 57–58. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. at 55. 
 73  See generally id. 
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mistrust grew correspondingly.74  As such, this period of change and 
heightened awareness of government action saw a surge in the 
involvement of special interest groups in legislative affairs.75 
World War I brought an end to Progressivism and to the direct 
democracy movement, most significantly because the war gave rise to 
new national priorities.76  Nevertheless, regardless of the criticisms 
levied against them, the Populist and Progressive movements 
remained present on the political terrain across the country.  The 
various direct democratic structures that these movements inserted 
into many state constitutions continue to be an important part of the 
law-making process in many states. 
C.  The Modern Era of Direct Democracy 
1.  Resurgence of the Use of the Initiative 
The debate over direct democracy and whether voters should 
weigh in directly on current policy issues has a long history.77  
Resurgence of the use of direct initiatives in recent years has 
rekindled this debate.78  Prior to the 1970s, direct legislation was not a 
phenomenon of major significance; only a few states east of the 
Mississippi River demonstrated an interest in extensively using direct 
legislation.79  In the 1970s, however, attention to direct legislation 
expanded beyond its traditional western base.80  The nature of the 
salient issues of the period, most notably a renewed and growing 
distrust in government and frustration with state legislatures, at least 
partially explains the surge in direct legislation in the states.81  While 
corruption on the state and local level may not be as pervasive today 
or in the 1970s as it was in the early 1900s, the influence of special 
interests is as prevalent as ever.82 
According to Professor Matthew Manweller, most scholars agree 
that the modern era of the initiative and referendum began in 1978 
with California’s passage of Proposition 13.83  Proposition 13 was a 
 
 74  See id. at 55. 
 75  Id. 
 76  SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 10. 
 77  MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at ix. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. at 5. 
 80  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. at 59. 
 82  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 3. 
 83  MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25. 
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June 1978 California ballot initiative allowing Californians to vote to 
cut statewide property taxes by more than half.84  The proposition 
brought national attention to the controversial initiative process and 
affected nationwide trends in the use of the direct initiative.85  First, it 
spurred similar tax-slashing measures in other states.86  Second, and 
more importantly for the purposes of this Comment, Proposition 13 
inspired conservative interest groups to organize campaigns to 
achieve their social and political goals, including measures favoring 
the death penalty, English-only regulations, prayer in public schools, 
and opposing pornography, abortion, and homosexuality.87  
Following the success of Proposition 13, the use of the ballot initiative 
surged in the late 1970s, a time when many controversial ballot issues 
appeared in various states.88  According to the Council of State 
Governments, the “initiative revolution,” which began in California in 
1978, has not only continued, but has accelerated in recent years.89 
While historians emphasize Proposition 13 in 1978 as a 
landmark in the modern era of direct legislation,90 other 
developments during this period are important to the discussion of 
the initiative’s impact on minority civil rights.  First, in the Supreme 
Court’s 1967 decision of Reitman v. Mulkey, the Court held that the 
California Supreme Court could invalidate an initiative the electorate 
passed authorizing housing discrimination.91  The Court found such 
overt state affirmation of discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92  Equally 
significant to the conflict between minority rights and direct 
legislation was Evangelist singer Anita Bryant’s 1977 campaign to 
repeal the sexual orientation anti-discrimination ordinance in Dade 
County, Florida, which began the first wave of anti-gay initiatives.93  
 
 84  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 3. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. at 3–4.  
 89  John G. Matsusaka, 2004 Initiatives and Referendums, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 
2005, at 388 (2005), available at http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs 
/BOS2005-InitiativesReferendums.pdf. 
 90  See MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25 (noting that most scholars agree that the 
modern era of the initiative process commenced with the Proposition 13 campaign 
in 1978). 
 91  Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
 92  Id. 
 93  See William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of 
Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 583, 606 
(1994). 
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Contemporaneously, California State Senator John Briggs led a 
campaign that placed Proposition 6 on the ballot.94  Proposition 6 
had the effect of severely limiting the rights of homosexual public 
school teachers in the state by “permitting school boards to fire any 
teacher who advocated, solicited, encouraged, or promoted public or 
private homosexual activity.”95  While Proposition 6 ultimately failed,96 
it is important to acknowledge the role of these events when 
considering the evolution of the same-sex marriage debate as it 
relates to the ballot initiative. 
2.  The Initiative in the States: By the Numbers 
To date, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have 
approved the initiative process; meanwhile, nearly every state 
legislature and the United States Congress have considered adopting 
some type of initiative process.97  Approximately four-fifths of the 
states that have adopted initiative procedures are west of the 
Mississippi River.98  Fifteen of the twenty-four states allow for the use 
of the initiative for statutes and constitutional amendments.99  Three 
allow its use only for constitutional amendments, while six states and 
the District of Columbia allow the initiative procedure only for 
statutes.100  Fourteen states and the District of Columbia use only the 
direct initiative, the process by which a ballot question is posed 
directly to the electorate upon the proper number of petition 
signatures; five states exclusively use the indirect initiative, the 
process by which the ballot measure is only posed to the electorate 
upon adoption by the legislature; three states use the indirect 
initiative for statutes while allowing the direct initiative for 
constitutional amendments; and two states use the direct and indirect 
initiative for statutes.101 
 
 94  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 94. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 28 (the jurisdictions that have adopted the 
initiative, in the order in which the initiative was adopted are: South Dakota, Utah, 
Oregon, Nevada, Montana, Oklahoma, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Arizona, 
Colorado, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Ohio, Nebraska, Washington, North Dakota, 
Massachusetts, Alaska, Florida, Wyoming, Illinois, District of Columbia, and 
Mississippi).   
 98  SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 10. 
 99  Id. at 27. 
 100  Id.  As the District of Columbia is not a state, it does not have its own 
constitution.  Constitutional rights in the District of Columbia are derived solely 
from the United States Constitution.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 101  See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in 
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D.  Criticisms of Direct Democracy and Plebiscitary Procedures 
1.  An Overview of Contemporary Criticisms and 
Justifications for the Initiative 
While direct democracy has many supporters, its critics are 
equally vocal.  There are many objections to the use of initiatives and 
referenda, but the essential argument against the use of the initiative 
is that “[p]lebiscitary processes are less likely than representative ones 
to generate decisions that reflect common conceptions of the public 
interest or social welfare.”102  In other words, a public vote is less likely 
to result in an outcome that is sound, balanced, and most beneficial 
for all.103  Implicit in this concern is the idea that a mere aggregation 
of will is insufficient to produce sound, ideal social decisions and that 
“universal and rational pursuit of self-interest does not necessarily 
generate an optimal collective result.”104 
In critiquing the modern initiative process in light of the 
Progressives’ goals, political scientist Betty Zisk concluded that the 
goals of the Progressives have not been met.105  Rather than replacing 
interest groups’ influence, ballot initiative campaigns provide interest 
groups with an alternative method to influence lawmaking.106  
Moreover, some of the common criticisms of direct democracy 
include the belief that the average voter is not sufficiently informed, 
sophisticated, or competent enough to understand complex issues 
and make sound policy decisions, and that advertising, media, special 
interests, and money can unduly influence the process.107  
Additionally, opponents of direct democracy argue that direct 
legislation benefits special interest groups, not the people at large; 
direct legislation results in long, complex ballots and frivolous 
proposals; voters are not sophisticated enough to understand the 
proposals and navigate the convoluted media campaigns surrounding 
initiatives; the legislative process is superior to direct legislation for 
policy-making; direct legislation will not serve to educate the public 
and will not enhance public involvement; and direct legislation poses 
a threat to democracy and minority rights.108  This discussion provides 
 
Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988). 
 102  Id. at 932. 
 103  See id. 
 104  Id. at 933–34. 
 105  BETTY ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS 250 (1987). 
 106  Id. 
 107  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 11. 
 108  MAGLEBY, supra note 21, at 30; see also MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 25. 
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only a cursory overview of the criticisms of direct democracy, and 
scholars and opponents have put forth many noteworthy criticisms of 
the initiative process.109 This Comment will limit its discussion to the 
impact that the initiative can have on minority rights and, specifically, 
the use of the initiative as implicated in the same-sex marriage 
debate. 
2.  An Introductory Focus on Issues of Equality and 
Minority Rights 
Though the initiative process certainly provides means through 
which voters are able to voice valid frustrations with representative 
government, the process of direct democracy has, nevertheless, long 
been feared as a threat to minority rights.110  According to William E. 
Adams, Jr., “[b]allot measures directed toward various minorities are 
frequently used by contemporary society.”111  Detractors of direct 
democracy posit that eliminating the safeguards built into 
representative government poses a special threat to disfavored and 
powerless groups.112  Such detractors point to initiatives proposed to 
ban school busing to enhance racial integration, to permit private 
discrimination in the sale of real property, and to declare English the 
official language of a locality.113  During the last thirty years, and 
continuing to the present, gays and lesbians remain one of the most 
targeted minority groups in initiative campaigns.114 
In this regard, Barbara S. Gamble studied the incidence of 
minority discrimination through ballot initiatives.115  Analyzing data 
after a three-decade study of ballot initiatives and referenda from 
1959–1993, and focusing on five major civil rights areas, including 
gay rights, Gamble concluded that initiatives seeking to limit civil 
rights experience greater electoral success than all other initiatives 
and referenda.116  Strikingly, voters have approved over three-quarters 
of initiatives limiting civil rights, while approving only one-third of all 
 
 109  See generally id. (for a comprehensive analysis of the many criticisms of direct 
democracy). 
 110  Adams, supra note 2, at 450. 
 111  Adams, supra note 93, at 603. 
 112  Charlow, supra note 17, at 529–30. 
 113  Id. at 530. 
 114  Adams, supra note 2, at 458. 
 115  Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 
245 (1997).   
 116  Id.  In addition to those affecting gays and lesbians, Gamble also surveyed civil 
rights initiatives targeted to limit the rights of ethnic, racial, and language minorities, 
as well as individuals with AIDS.  Id.  
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initiatives and referenda.117  Moreover, Gamble found that the public 
has placed the rights of gays and lesbians on the ballot for a popular 
vote more often than any other minority group, as nearly sixty 
percent of civil rights initiatives during the period of her study 
targeted gays and lesbians.118  A more recent article confirmed 
Gamble’s conclusion, finding that minorities are likely to lose at the 
ballot box.119 
Many state initiatives in the past decade have sought to proscribe 
same-sex marriages.120  For instance, California’s Proposition 8 and 
Alaska’s Ballot Measure 2 are examples of initiatives limiting marriage 
to opposite-sex couples.121  During the November 2008 election, 
Arizona, California, and Florida voted on same-sex marriage ban 
initiatives, while in 2004, eleven states voted on similar measures.122 
The hostility surrounding same-sex marriage first seized 
widespread public attention in 1993, with the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii’s ruling in Baehr v. Lewin.123  In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court held that refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples qualified as sex discrimination under that state’s 
constitution.124  In 1998, Hawaii state legislators responded by 
proposing a referendum defining marriage as between one man and 
one woman, which was approved by a margin of sixty-eight to thirty-
 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. at 257.  
 119  Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth Meier, Legislative Victory, Electoral 
Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 20 REV. 
POL’Y RES. 671, 676 (2003). 
 120  Morse, supra note 7, at 963. 
 121  Id. at 964.  In 2009, Vermont became the first state in which the legislature 
acted without judicial mandate to allow same-sex marriage.  Same-Sex Marriage, Civil 
Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 14, 
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430.  Maine and New Hampshire 
followed suit the same year.  Id.  Before a single same-sex marriage was performed in 
Maine, however, a successful November 2009 ballot measure repealed the newly 
adopted law.  Id.  In November 2012, voters responded by passing a ballot measure 
allowing for same-sex marriage.  Ben Brumfield, Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage for 
the First Time, CNN, Nov. 7, 2012, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/pol-same-sex-marriage/index.html. 
 122  Tiffany Sharples, Ballot Initiatives: No to Gay Marriage, Anti-Abortion Measures, 
TIME, Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article 
/0,8599,1856820,00.html  
 123  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–2 (1997). 
 124  Ballotwatch 2008, Same Sex Marriage: Breaking the Firewall in California, 
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE 1 (Nov. 2008), available at 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202008-2%20%28Marriage%29.pdf; EVAN 
GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 44–45 (2004).  
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two percent.125  Around this time, opponents of same-sex marriage in 
other states—Alaska in 1998 and California, Nebraska, and Nevada in 
2000— placed “defense of marriage” measures on their ballots; the 
states’ electorates approved all of these measures.126  Unlike the other 
states, which sought the ban by constitutional amendment, through 
the passage of Proposition 22, California approved the ban by a 
statutory initiative.127  According to the Initiative and Referendum 
Institute, same-sex marriage has been a particularly pervasive issue 
since the February 2004 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case 
of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,128 in which that court found 
a right to same-sex marriage in the state’s constitution.129  Responding 
to the 2004 decision, same-sex marriage opponents throughout the 
country organized to adopt state constitutional amendments defining 
marriage as that between a man and a woman in order to thwart a 
similar ruling in their respective states.130  For instance, the highest 
profile initiative in 2009 was Maine’s Question 1, which repealed a 
statute legalizing same-sex marriage, by a fifty-three to forty-seven 
percent margin.131  As of November 2009, electorates across the 
country have rejected same-sex marriage in thirty-three of thirty-four 
ballot measures.132  The conflicting case law analyzed in Part III 
evidences the tensions between direct democracy and vulnerable and 
disempowered minorities. 
III.  THE BALLOT INITIATIVE IN THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
CONTROVERSY: A CASE-BY-CASE COMPARISON OF TWO RECENT CASES 
This section will discuss two recent cases, Strauss v. Horton and 
Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, in which the 
respective courts considered the validity of initiatives, one statutory 
and one constitutional, attempting to restrict the rule of law allowing 
same-sex couples to marry.133  The review of these two cases and their 
disparate holdings will lead to the discussion of the District of 
 
 125  Ballotwatch 2008, supra note 124. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. 
 128  798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 129  Ballotwatch, Election 2009: Same-Sex Marriage and TELS, INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM INSTITUTE 1 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202009-2%20Results%20%28v1%29.pdf. 
 130  Id.  
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89 (D.C. 2010); Strauss v. 
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
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Columbia’s use of the Human Rights Safeguard to protect minority 
rights against an omnipotent attack via direct initiative.  Moreover, 
the comparison will advance the proposition that other jurisdictions 
ought to adopt direct initiative reforms modeled after the District of 
Columbia’s Human Rights Safeguard. 
A.  Strauss v. Horton 
1.  Background and Majority Opinion 
Legislating by initiative has been an important feature of 
California governance since the process’s adoption in 1911.134  On 
November 4, 2008, a majority of California voters approved notorious 
Proposition 8, which was the center of the controversy leading to the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Strauss v. Horton.135  
Proposition 8 added the following section to the state’s constitution: 
“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”136  California’s initiative procedure distinguishes between 
constitutional amendments, which are permissible subjects of direct 
initiatives, and constitutional revisions, which are not.137  A revision is 
characterized as a “wholesale or fundamental alteration of the 
constitutional structure that appropriately could be undertaken only 
by a constitutional convention,” while an amendment includes “any 
and all of the more discrete changes to the Constitution that 
thereafter might be proposed.”138  This distinction was important to 
the court’s analysis in determining the validity of Proposition 8.139  In 
Strauss, the question before the California Supreme Court was 
whether Proposition 8, a constitutional initiative defining marriage in 
the state as marriage between a man and a woman, was a 
constitutional amendment, and therefore valid under California’s 
Constitution, or a constitutional revision, and therefore invalid and 
unconstitutional.140 
In upholding the validity of Proposition 8, the majority reasoned 
that its role was not “to determine whether the provision at issue is 
wise or sound as a matter of policy” or whether the justices “believe[d] 
 
 134  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 3. 
 135  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59. 
 136  Proposition 8, located at CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 7.5; see Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59. 
 137  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61.   
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. at 60.  Oregon also draws this distinction between a constitutional 
amendment and a constitutional revision.  OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 2. 
 140  Strauss, 107 P.3d at 59. 
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it should be a part of the California Constitution.”141  Holding that 
Proposition 8 constituted a mere amendment, the majority reasoned 
that “the act of limiting access to the designation of marriage to 
opposite-sex couples does not have a substantial or, indeed, even a 
minimal effect on the governmental plan or framework of California” 
existing prior to Proposition 8.142  In holding that the new 
constitutional amendment denying the recognition of same-sex 
marriages carved out merely a “limited exception” to the scope of the 
state constitution’s equal protection clause and principles,143 the court 
effectively held that the designation of “inalienable” rights in 
California’s constitution did not signify that these rights are exempt 
from limitation or restriction by popular vote.144 
 
 141  Id.   
 142  Id. at 62.   
 143  Id. at 78.   
 144  Id. at 116.  As noted supra, note 15, a recent decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that Proposition 8 is 
unconstitutional.  Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (formerly Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)).  In Perry, a three-judge panel 
of the 9th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, concluding that the initiative power may not be 
employed to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and to strip that 
group, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to 
marry.  Id. at 1064.  In so ruling, the court acknowledged but did not address what 
the majority characterized as “[b]roader issues”: “[w]hether under the Constitution 
same-sex couples may ever be denied the right to marry a right that has long been 
enjoyed by opposite-sex couples, is an important and highly controversial question” 
and “currently a matter of great debate in our nation. . . over which people of good 
will may disagree, sometimes strongly.”  Id.  Instead, the court adhered to the 
principle of only ruling on the constitutional questions squarely presented in the 
case and, thereby, decided the case on a much narrower basis.  Id.  More specifically, 
the court focused its analysis on the “singular and limited change” that Proposition 8 
worked to the California State Constitution, namely “stripp[ing] same-sex couples of 
the right to have their committed relationships recognized by the State with the 
designation of ‘marriage,’ which the state constitution had previously guaranteed 
them,” while leaving in place all of their other rights and responsibilities that are 
identical to those of married spouses and integral to a partnership.  Id. at 1076. 
 The court went on to phrase the question presented for its consideration as 
follows:  
[D]id the People of California have legitimate reasons for enacting a 
constitutional amendment that serves only to take away from same-sex 
couples the right to have their lifelong relationships dignified by the 
official status of ‘marriage,’ and to compel the State and its officials 
and all others authorized to perform marriage ceremonies to substitute 
the label of ‘domestic partnership’ for their relationships?   
Id. at 1079.  Answering this question in the negative, the court considered and 
rejected a series of proffered justifications in support of Proposition 8, including 
furthering the state’s interest in childrearing and responsible procreation, protecting 
religious freedom, and preventing children from being taught about same-sex 
marriage in schools.  Id. at 1076–79.  In so ruling, the court expressly relied heavily 
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2.  Justice Moreno’s Dissent: The Promise of Equality, 
Compelling “the Will of the Majority to Be Tempered 
by Justice”145 
Justice Moreno sharply criticized the majority’s finding that 
Proposition 8 was merely a constitutional amendment and not a 
constitutional revision.146  In response to the majority’s holding, 
Justice Moreno asserted that: 
[d]escribing the effect of Proposition 8 as narrow and 
limited fails to acknowledge the significance of the 
discrimination it requires. But even a narrow and limited 
exception to the promise of full equality strikes at the core 
of, and thus fundamentally alters, the guarantee of equal 
treatment that has pervaded the California Constitution 
since 1849.  Promising equal treatment to some is 
fundamentally different from promising equal treatment to 
all. Promising treatment that is almost equal is 
fundamentally different from ensuring truly equal 
treatment. Granting a disfavored minority only some of the 
rights enjoyed by the majority is fundamentally different 
from recognizing, as a constitutional imperative, that they 
 
on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 
particularly the presence or absence of a legitimate state interest constituting a 
rational basis for the proposition, and rejected as inappropriate any reliance on 
Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527 (1982).  Perry, 671 F.3d at 1083–84 (firmly 
rejecting the position that “unless the Fourteenth Amendment actually requires that 
the designation of ‘marriage’ be given to same-sex couples in the first place, there 
can be no constitutional infirmity in taking the designation away from that group of 
citizens, whatever the People’s reason for doing so”).  Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the absence of any legitimate purpose for Proposition 8 compelled 
“‘the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is borne of animosity 
toward,’ or, as is more likely with respect to Californians who voted for the 
Proposition, mere disapproval of, ‘the class of persons affected.’”  Id. at 1080 
(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).  Judge Smith filed a partial concurrence and partial 
dissent, in which he said he would have distinguished Romer because of certain 
differences he identified between Proposition 8 and the Colorado state 
constitutional amendment at issue in Romer.  Id. at 1096 (Smith, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
Though the court in Perry invalidates Proposition 8 under a rational basis 
analysis and not because Proposition 8 violates an individual’s human rights per se, 
the Perry decision is important because the court restrains the right to initiative, 
prioritizing equal protection under the law over the majority’s right to direct 
democracy.  Id. at 1064 (“The People may not employ the initiative power to single 
out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate 
justification, of a right as important as the right to marry.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the district court.”). 
 145  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 130 (Moreno, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 146  Id.  
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must be granted all of those rights.147 
Justice Moreno reasoned that Proposition 8 does not merely amend, 
but instead revises the California Constitution because it struck the 
core of the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment by limiting 
the rights of the disfavored minority.148  In so doing, Justice Moreno 
rejected the majority’s reasoning that Proposition 8 is only an 
amendment because it alters only certain rights of a small segment of 
the population.149  Justice Moreno further reasoned that the Equal 
Protection Clause’s role in protecting vulnerable minorities from the 
will of the majority constitutes an underlying principle of California’s 
Constitution.150  Therefore, the disintegration of a fundamental right 
enjoyed by gays and lesbians as inflicted by Proposition 8 amounted 
to a constitutional revision, not a mere amendment.151 
Contending that Proposition 8 should be invalidated because of 
its implications on the fundamental rights of gays and lesbians, and 
warning about the impact of the majority’s ruling on the rights of 
vulnerable minorities, Justice Moreno further disagreed with the 
majority: 
Unlike modifying legislative or judicially created remedies, 
withholding a fundamental right from a minority group on 
the basis of a suspect classification is inherently antithetical 
to the core principle of equal protection that minorities are 
to be protected against the prejudice of majorities by 
requiring that laws apply equally to all segments of society.152 
Justice Moreno emphasized the intrinsic inequality in withholding a 
fundamental right from a minority group on the basis of a suspect 
classification, stressing that equal protection means protecting 
minorities against the whim of the majority.153 
 
 147  Id.  
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at 133–34. 
 151  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 134.   
 152  Id. at 136.  California Attorney General Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown proposed 
an interesting alternative argument to Justice Moreno’s argument.  Attorney General 
Brown argued that the court should find Proposition 8 invalid because it abrogated 
inalienable rights protected by Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution 
without a compelling justification.  Attorney General’s Response to Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, Strauss v. Horton, No. S168047 2009 WL 853622 (Cal.), at *2.  While Attorney 
General Brown analyzed Proposition 8 under a fundamental rights framework and 
Justice Moreno based his analysis on an equal protection framework, both analyses 
resulted in the same conclusion—that Proposition 8 was an unlawful constitutional 
amendment under the California Constitution.   
 153  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 133.   
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Justice Moreno recognized that the initiative process in 
California was intended to remedy government corruption, serving as 
an antidote to powerful special interests and the state legislature’s 
“own self-serving inertia.”154  Justice Moreno likewise acknowledged 
that it was well-known that the widespread adoption of the direct 
initiative came from the Progressive movement, but found no 
evidence that the Progressives intended to preclude the court’s 
protection of vulnerable minorities from the will of the majority, or 
to abolish the judiciary’s role as protector of the fundamental rights 
of the politically vulnerable.155  Justice Moreno distinguished between 
preventing the influence of politically powerful minority groups, a 
key purpose for direct initiatives, and “preventing courts from 
protecting the rights of disfavored minorities unable to obtain equal 
rights through the usual majoritarian processes.”156 
Proposition 8 began as a reaction to the consolidated California 
Supreme Court case, In re Marriage Cases.157  In In re Marriage Cases, the 
California Supreme Court decided by a four to three margin that 
California’s exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage 
violated the state constitution’s equal protection guarantee.158  Critics 
characterize Proposition 8 as a “statement of disapproval.”159  By 
limiting the use of the term “marriage” to opposite-sex couples, 
Proposition 8 implicitly rendered same-sex couples unacceptable and 
abnormal, labeling same-sex couples inferior and disfavored.160  
Justice Moreno proposed that equal protection is not simply a 
discrete constitutional right, but a “basic constitutional principle that 
guides all legislation and compels the will of the majority to be 
tempered by justice.”161 
Rather than take the technical, quantitative approach the Strauss 
majority utilized, Justice Moreno appeared to adopt a more holistic, 
qualitative approach to analyzing the constitutionality of Proposition 
8, finding that the proposition drastically altered the nature and 
operation of the California system of government.162  Therefore, such 
a far-reaching change could not be achieved by constitutional 
 
 154  See id. at 136.   
 155  Id.   
 156  Id.  
 157  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 158  Id. 
 159  See Morse, supra note 7 at 984. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 130.  
 162  Id. at 129. 
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amendment, but rather only by revision.163  Moreover, Justice Moreno 
warned that the majority’s holding weakened the status of 
California’s Constitution “bulwark of fundamental rights for 
minorities protected from the will of the majority.”164  Even near-
equal treatment, according to Justice Moreno, violates the promise of 
equality under the law.165  This concern is also evident in the District 
of Columbia’s utilization of the Human Rights Safeguard in its direct 
initiative process.166  The importance of the Human Rights Safeguard 
as a tool to protect minority rights is evidenced in the case of Jackson 
v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics.167 
B.  Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics 
This section seeks to compare the disparate outcomes of the 
Strauss and Jackson decisions.  In Strauss, the majority validated a 
direct initiative that limited the rights of same-sex couples.168  While 
the Jackson decision addressed the same issue, the Jackson majority 
came to an entirely different conclusion by ultimately upholding the 
rights of same-sex couples.169  The long and technical history of the 
District of Columbia’s sovereignty is also important in order to place 
the significance of the Jackson decision in its proper context, and 
therefore it is addressed below, along with a detailed discussion of the 
case itself. 
1.  Home Rule for the District of Columbia 
To understand the importance of the Human Rights Safeguard 
as part of the District of Columbia’s initiative process, it is essential 
first to consider the recent history of the District’s home rule, which 
created the Council and gave the Council the authority to adopt the 
initiative process.170  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has 
characterized the District of Columbia as “a unique and complex 
governmental structure.”171  Article I of the United States Constitution 
 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. at 131 (“Promising treatment that is almost equal is fundamentally 
different from ensuring truly equal treatment.”). 
 166  See infra Parts III.B.1–2. 
 167  Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89 (D.C. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).   
 168  Strauss, 207 P.3d 48. 
 169  Jackson, 999 A.2d 89. 
 170  See Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973).   
 171  Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441 
A.2d 889, 916 (D.C. 1981).   
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grants Congress complete legislative authority over the District of 
Columbia.172  The fight for sovereignty in the District of Columbia has 
a long history.173  In 1912, United States Representatives Tavenner 
and Prouty introduced home rule bills that incorporated initiative 
and referendum procedures.174  Neither of the bills passed, and it was 
not until 1973 that Congress granted the District of Columbia partial 
home rule.175  Direct democracy soon followed the successful 
campaign for sovereignty. 
The 1973 passage of the District of Columbia Self-Government 
and Government Reorganization Act (“Home Rule Act”) brought 
home rule to the District.176  The District of Columbia Charter, Title 
IV of the Home Rule Act, established the District’s ruling elected 
body, the District of Columbia Council.177  The Charter granted the 
Council considerable legislative authority.178 
 
 172  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 173  See generally SCHMIDT, supra note 48. 
 174  Id. at 228. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973).  Importantly, the original Home Rule 
Act contained two types of legislative vetoes.  First, there was a two-house veto for 
most actions, whereby Congress could block the District of Columbia Council’s 
actions by majority vote of both houses.  There was also a distinct one-house veto 
from criminal laws, whereby one house could block the Council’s actions in the 
criminal law context by a majority vote.  Memorandum from Richard A. Hauser, 
Deputy Counsel to the President, to J. Steven Rhodes, Assistant to the Vice President 
for Domestic Policy 1 (Apr. 6, 1984), available at 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/roberts/Box09JGRChadhareDistrictofColumbia10 
.pdf.  The landmark decision of INS v. Chadha, which invalidated the one-house 
legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as unconstitutional, 
called into question the validity of any previously enacted law that contained a 
legislative veto mechanism.  Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919 (1983).  Due to the constitutional questions raised by the Chadha decision, 
Congress replaced the legislative vetoes in the Home Rule Act with a joint resolution 
of disapproval, which places the burden on Congress to nullify an act of the Council.  
Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
273, 286 (1993), available at http://www.loufisher.org/docs/lv/legveto93.pdf. 
 177  Subject to Congressional oversight, as required by article I, section 8, of the 
United States Constitution, the Home Rule Act delegated legislative self-rule to the 
District of Columbia, authorized the election of local officials by the D.C. electorate, 
granted District of Columbia citizens the powers of self-government, “modernize[d], 
reorganize[d], and otherwise improve[d] the governmental structure” of the District, 
and relieved Congress of the burden of legislating local issues for the District.  D.C. 
CODE § 1-102(a) (2001). 
 178  Id. at § 1-203.03.  Generally, once the Council passes legislation, it becomes 
effective after a thirty-legislative-day layover so long as the D.C. mayor does not veto 
the act within ten days of its passage.  Id. at § 1-206.02(c)(1).  Congress may 
disapprove a measure by passing a concurrent resolution to defeat it.  Id. 
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2.  The Human Rights Act: A History of Prioritizing the 
Eradication of Government-Sanctioned Discrimination 
The Human Rights Act in the District of Columbia is not only 
significant to the holding in Jackson, but critical to understanding the 
policy priorities in the District.  The District’s historical prioritization 
of human rights is evidenced by the adoption of the Human Rights 
Safeguard.179  The pre-Home Rule Council adopted the first 
manifestation of the Human Rights Act in 1973, as Title thirty-four of 
the D.C. Rules and Regulations, known as the “Human Rights Law.”180  
On June 16, 1977, members of the Council of the District of 
Columbia introduced the “Human Rights Act of 1977,” Bill-2-179, by 
which the Council intended to codify the Human Rights Law to make 
it a permanent part of the District Of Columbia Code.181  The 
Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs Chairperson, 
John A. Wilson, reported that the codification of the Human Rights 
Law would serve three primary purposes: (1) to remove any questions 
“as to certain provisions of Title thirty-four because of its present 
status as a police regulation issued by the pre-Home Rule city 
government;” (2) to reinforce the Council’s stance that the Act was 
among the District’s “most important laws” and was to be “vigorously 
enforced by all agencies and officials” of D.C. government; and (3) to 
assure that licensing laws and other provisions of the code are 
interpreted and enforced to give full effect to the provision.182  To 
resolve concerns, the Council enacted the Human Rights Act of 1977, 
which put the Human Rights Law on “firm legal footing”183 by 
bestowing upon it “the increased dignity and force of a statute.”184 
With the codification of the preexisting Human Rights Law as 
 
 179  See generally D.C. Council Comm. on Pub. Serv. and Consumer Affairs Report, 
B. 2-179, at 1 (July 5, 1977) [hereinafter 2-179 Report] (on file with author).   
 180  Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210, 217 (D.C. 2007) (citing 34 DCRR § 3.1) 
(1973). 
 181  2-179 Report, supra note 179.  The bill made no substantive changes to the 
“Human Rights Law” as part of the then-current D.C. Rules and Regulations.  Id.  
 182  Id.; see Blodgett, 930 A.2d at 217 (positing that the Council re-enacted the 
Human Rights Law regulation as a statutory provision in order to give the Human 
Rights Law the force and effect of a statute).  With re-enactment of the Human 
Rights Law, the Council hoped to both clarify the district’s commitment to the 
protection of human rights and to facilitate the enforcement of the law in the post-
Home Rule district.  Id. at 217–18. 
 183  2-179 Report, supra note 179.  
 184  Id.  Furthermore, in the committee report, Chairman Wilson acknowledged 
that several court cases had questioned the pre-Home Rule government’s authority 
to enforce some of the provisions contained in Title 34.  Id. at 2.  The Chairman was 
concerned about the efficacy and enforceability of the Human Rights Law in light of 
various D.C. Court of Appeals decisions at the time.  Id. at 5. 
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the Human Rights Act, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to 
eliminating discrimination in the District as “the highest priority.”185  
In this regard, the D.C. Code provides: 
It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia, in 
enacting this chapter, to secure an end in the District of 
Columbia to discrimination for any reason other than that 
of individual merit, including, but not limited to, 
discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status, 
family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, 
genetic information, disability, source of income, status as a 
victim of an intrafamily offense, and place of residence or 
business.186 
i.  The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter 
Amendment Act of 1977 
While one might think that a measure allowing for the ballot 
initiative would be unrelated to human rights concerns, the District 
of Columbia’s experience proves quite the opposite.187  As discussed 
in the previous section, the District of Columbia’s history of 
sovereignty demonstrates a prioritization of human rights.188  A 
concern for the preservation of human rights is likewise evident 
throughout the District of Columbia Council’s process to adopt the 
direct initiative in the District.189  This prioritization would ensure that 
 
 185  Id. at 4. 
 186  D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (West 2001).  The original, pre-Home Rule Human 
Rights Act explicitly precluded discrimination based on the following categories: 
“race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, 
sexual orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical 
handicap, source of income, and place of residence or business.”  Jackson v. Dist. of 
Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 97 (D.C. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1001 (2011).  The Council has left the Human Rights Act largely unchanged 
since 1977, but has amended it to include new classifications to the list of protected 
categories.  In Blodgett, the court enumerated the following amendments to the 
original act: “‘[P]hysical handicap’ replaced with ‘disability,’ D.C. Law 10-129, 41 
D.C.Reg. 2583 (June 28, 1994); ‘familial status’ added by D.C. Law 12-242, 46 
D.C.Reg. 952 (April 20, 1999); ‘genetic information’ added by D.C. Law 15-263, 52 
D.C.Reg. 237 (April 5, 2005); ‘gender identity or expression’ added by D.C. Law 16-
58, 53 D.C.Reg. 14 (March 8, 2006); ‘status as a victim of an intrafamily offense’ 
added by D.C. Law 16-273, 54 D.C.Reg. 18 (May 4, 2007).”  Blodgett, 930 A.2d at 218 
n.4. 
 187  See supra text accompanying notes 179–86; see infra text accompanying notes 
201–27. 
 188  See supra text accompanying notes 179–86. 
 189  See infra text accompanying notes 201–27. 
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the advent of the direct initiative would not mean the demise of 
minority rights in the district. 
The 1977 Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter 
Amendment Act (“CAA”) authorized the initiative process for citizens 
in the District of Columbia.190  The District of Columbia’s original 
Charter, as adopted in 1973, did not contain any initiative, 
referendum, or recall procedures.191  The Charter set forth an 
amendment procedure to allow for flexible governing.192  Before 
submission to Congress for a layover period, the Council must pass a 
proposed amendment and a majority of registered voters must ratify 
it.193  The process to adopt the CAA began in 1976, when D.C. 
Council Member Julius W. Hobson, Sr., made the first serious 
attempt to adopt an initiative procedure.194  The Council passed the 
CAA in 1977 and, following ratification by a majority of registered 
voters on November 7, 1977, Congress approved the CAA as part of 
the District’s Charter.195 
In a memorandum from Councilman-at-Large and bill sponsor, 
Julius W. Hobson, to his fellow councilmembers, Councilman 
Hobson heralded the CAA as the “only means through which the 
people of the District of Columbia can participate directly in their 
government.”196  Councilman Hobson further described the impetus 
for the CAA: in the post-Watergate atmosphere of the time, public-
opinion polls suggested that the public had become increasingly 
suspicious of public officials and the traditional political process, 
both of which were largely influenced by high-paid lobbyists and 
special interests.197 
Section 1(a) of the CAA defines “initiative” as a “process by 
which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws 
(except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws 
directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia 
for their approval or disapproval.”198  The CAA became effective on 
March 10, 1978, following concurrent resolution by the Senate and 
 
 190  Jackson, 999 A.2d 89, 96 (discussing 24 D.C. Reg. 199 (July 8, 1977)). 
 191  Id. 
 192  See D.C. CODE § 1-203.03 (West 2001). 
 193  Id. 
 194  SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 228. 
 195  Hessey v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 601 A.2d 3, 12 (D.C. 1991). 
 196  Memorandum from Julius Hobson, Councilman-at-Large, D.C. Council, to all 
Councilmembers 1 (Jan. 3. 1977) [hereinafter Jan. 1977 Memo] (on file with 
author). 
 197  Id. at 3. 
 198  D.C. CODE § 1-204.101 (West 2001). 
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House of Representatives.199  As adopted, the CAA was not self-
executing, and did not include specific procedures to ensure its 
implementation.200 
ii.  The Human Rights Act as a Safeguard Embedded in the 
Initiative Process 
The CAA authorized the D.C. Council to adopt implementing 
legislation.201  As codified, the CAA provided the Council with the 
authority to adopt acts “necessary to carry out the purpose of this 
subpart within 180 days of the effective date . . . .”202  In addition to 
adopting technical procedures to facilitate implementation, the 
Council promptly debated a proposal to substantively limit the scope 
of initiative issues by “tie-barring”203 the Human Rights Act to the 
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Procedures Act of 1979 (“IPA”).204  
Prior to inclusion, the Council extensively debated incorporating the 
Human Rights Act.205  Ultimately, in June 1979, the Council approved 
implementing legislation, the IPA, which included the Human Rights 
Act Safeguard.206 
Nationwide events implicating gay rights occurring 
simultaneously with the Council’s decision to include the Human 
Rights Safeguard in the IPA undoubtedly played a role in the 
Council’s deliberations.  This influence is evidenced by the Jackson 
court noting that “recent events would have afforded the Council 
good reason to anticipate that an initiative or referendum that would 
have the effect of authorizing discrimination could be a threat to the 
peace and to life and limb.”207  In June 1977, activist and evangelist 
Anita Bryant led a successful campaign to repeal a Dade County, 
Florida ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on an 
 
 199  D.C. Council Comm. on Gov’t Operations Report, B. 3-2, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1979) 
[hereinafter 3-2 Report] (on file with author).   
 200  Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A. 2d 89, 96–97 (D.C. 2010). 
 201  Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 399 A.2d 
550, 551 (D.C. 1979). 
 202  D.C. CODE § 1-204.107 (2012).  
 203  Tie-barring is a legislative tactic by which one bill is written to correspond to, 
or be read in tandem with, a provision in another bill or statute.  
 204  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 97. 
 205  See D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, B. 2-317, 2–11.  (May 3, 1978) 
[hereinafter 2-317 Report] (on file with author).  The legislative history, legal 
background, and public commentary surrounding the adoption of the IPA are 
evidence that the Council extensively debated the inclusion of the Human Rights 
Act.   
 206  Id. 
 207  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 112 n.44. 
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individual’s sexual orientation.208  Bryant’s campaign incited violent 
clashes between the opponents and proponents of the campaign.209  
Bryant’s efforts to repeal the sexual orientation anti-discrimination 
ordinance in Dade County marked the first wave of anti-gay 
initiatives.210  Contemporaneously, California State Senator John 
Briggs successfully led a campaign to place Proposition 6 on the 
ballot,211 which, if passed, would have severely limited the rights of 
homosexual public school teachers in the state.212  The court in 
Jackson reasoned that, at the time the Council included the Human 
Rights Act in the IPA, recent events gave the Council good reason to 
anticipate that the direct initiative could be used to threaten civil 
rights and, therefore, that the Council had grounds to cautiously 
incorporate the Human Rights Safeguard into the IPA.213 
This heightened awareness of the prevalence of anti-gay and 
anti-lesbian social campaigns is evident in the legislative history of the 
IPA; interest groups’ support also weighed into the Council’s 
deliberations.214  As the D.C. Court of Appeals noted, many 
individuals who testified before the Council’s Committee on 
Government Operations expressed support for the adoption of the 
Human Rights Safeguard as a part of the implementing legislation.215  
Importantly, the Gay Activists Alliance of Washington, D.C. and other 
citizens participated in the public hearings and deliberations, 
providing materials expressing support for the human rights 
exception from the right to the initiative.216  Prior to the committee’s 
public hearing on the IPA, the staff “received myriad telephone calls” 
supporting an amendment that would limit initiatives promoting 
discrimination.217  Given the record of support for the inclusion of the 
Human Rights Act, one can fairly infer the connection that the 
Jackson court expressly drew between the heightened attention to the 
first wave of anti-gay and anti-lesbian initiatives218 and the Council’s 
incorporation of the Human Rights Safeguard in the IPA. 
 
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. 
 210  Adams, supra note 93, at 606. 
 211  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 94. 
 212  Id. 
 213  Id. 
 214  See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 4–6. 
 215  Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 97 (D.C. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).  
 216  See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 4–5. 
 217  Id. at 5. 
 218  Adams, supra note 93, at 606. 
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Reitman v. Mulkey219 also played a prominent role in the Council’s 
deliberations on limiting the scope of the electorate’s authority to 
directly legislate through initiative.220  Reitman was a landmark 
decision.221  Proposition 14, the California initiative at issue in 
Reitman, forbade the state from abridging the rights of an individual 
to sell or not to sell his or her property as he or she chose.222  Its 
drafters designed Proposition 14 to overturn state laws that 
prohibited the practice of housing discrimination involving the state 
affirmatively endorsing racial discrimination related to property 
rights.223  The United States Supreme Court upheld the Supreme 
Court of California’s decision to invalidate Proposition 14 as violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.224  The 
Council’s Committee on Government Operations reasoned that 
Reitman turned on whether the state could allow an initiative that 
affirmatively promoted discrimination as a matter of law, not whether 
the initiative violated a constitutional right.225  The Committee 
determined that “the initiative process may not be used to place the 
government in the posture of affirmatively condoning 
discrimination” and that an initiative stripping the government of 
“neutrality toward protected minority classifications” must fail.226  
Reflecting on the framework of Reitman, the Committee on 
Government Operations concluded that to establish an initiative and 
referendum procedure that allowed for discrimination “would 
involve the District government in condoning and assisting with 
discrimination.”227 
3.  Background and Facts of the Case 
The D.C. Court of Appeals considered Jackson at a time of 
tremendous conflict over gay rights in the District of Columbia.228  In 
2009, the District of Columbia Council passed two statutes promoting 
same-sex marriage: the Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 2009 
(“JAMA”)229 and the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality 
 
 219  387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
 220   2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 10–11. 
 221  Id. 
 222  Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370–71. 
 223  Id. at 374. 
 224  Id. at 370–71.  
 225  2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 10. 
 226  Id. at 9. 
 227  Jackson v. D.C. Board of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 112 (D.C. 2010). 
 228  See id. at 93. 
 229  Id. (citing D.C. CODE § 46-405.01 (2009)). 
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Amendment Act of 2009.230  The Council’s approval of same-sex 
marriage provoked action by citizens opposed to same-sex marriage, 
leading to the proposal of the “Marriage Initiative of 2009.”231  The 
Jackson court considered the validity of this initiative.232  In May 2009, 
the District of Columbia Council passed the JAMA, which recognized 
the validity of same-sex marriages entered into in other 
jurisdictions.233  In an effort to undo the effects of JAMA, on 
September 1, 2009, appellants filed a proposed initiative, the 
“Marriage Initiative of 2009,” with the District of Columbia Board of 
Elections and Ethics (“Board”).234  Appellants proposed an initiative 
aimed to amend Title 46, Subtitle I, Chapter 4 of the D.C. Code 
(“Code”) to state: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in the District of Columbia.”235  During the course 
of the Jackson proceedings, the D.C. Council adopted the Religious 
Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009 
(“Marriage Equality Act”), which expanded the legal definition of 
marriage in D.C. to provide for same-sex marriages.236  It became 
effective as D.C. Law 18-110 on March 3, 2010.237  The passage of the 
Marriage Initiative Act therefore would have nullified both JAMA and 
the Marriage Equality Act.238 
The D.C. Code permits the Board to reject a proposed initiative 
if it finds that the measure is “not a proper subject of initiative or 
referendum.”239  The Code explicitly outlines what types of measures 
are improper, requiring the Board to reject any measure that 
 
 230  Id. (citing 57 D.C. Reg. 1833 (Mar. 5, 2010)). 
 231  Id. 
 232  Id. 
 233  D.C. CODE § 46-405.01 (2010).   
 234  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93. 
 235  Id.  The language proposed in the initiative is the standard text for a Defense 
of Marriage Act.  Nevertheless, this version was milder than other acts in that it did 
not repeal previously recognized same-sex marriages.  See ANDREW KOPPLEMAN, SAME 
SEX, DIFFERENT STATES 137–48 (2006).  Koppleman explains that many states adopted 
“mini-DOMA” statutes in three waves in response to the progress of the same-sex 
marriage movement.  Id. at 137.  The first wave occurred in 1970s following a few 
lawsuits filed by same-sex couples seeking the right to marry, while the second phase 
occurred in the 1990s following the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court case Baehr v. Lewin, 
leading many opponents to worry that the state would soon recognize same-sex 
marriage.  Id. at 137–138; see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  The final 
wave occurred in the 2000s, following the Massachusetts and Vermont State Supreme 
Court decisions constitutionally mandating the recognition of same-sex marriage.  Id. 
at 138. 
 236  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93. 
 237  Id. 
 238  See id. 
 239  D.C. CODE § 1-1001.16(b)(1) (2012).  
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“authorizes, or would have the effect of authorizing, discrimination 
prohibited under [the Human Rights Act].”240  After a public hearing 
on October 26, 2009, the Board rejected the Marriage Initiative Act, 
finding that it was not a proper subject of initiative under the CAA 
because it had the effect of authorizing discrimination.241  The Board 
concluded that “[w]hile neither the HRA nor its legislative history 
explicitly mentions same-sex marriage, it is without question that the 
HRA must ‘be read broadly to eliminate the many proscribed forms 
of discrimination in the District.’”242  Appellants, following the 
applicable procedures, then sought a writ of mandamus requesting 
that the D.C. Superior Court review and certify the initiative.243  The 
Superior Court found in favor of the District, holding that the 
Human Rights Act is a valid limitation on the initiative process and 
that the Marriage Initiative of 2009 would authorize discrimination.244  
An appeal followed the Superior Court’s ruling.245 
4. The D.C. Court of Appeals’ Holding and Analysis 
Before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, appellants 
argued that the Human Rights Safeguard of the IPA improperly 
expanded the Council’s authority under the CAA, and therefore the 
Council lacked the authority to reject appellants’ initiative.246  To 
provide historical context, the court observed that a comparison to 
other jurisdictions’ initiative mechanisms would not be constructive 
 
 240  § 1-1001.16(b)(1)(C). 
 241  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93. 
 242  Marriage Initiative of 2009, No. 09-006 11 (D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics Nov. 
17, 2009) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (quoting Dean v. District of 
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 320 (D.C. 1995)), available at 
http://www.dcboee.org/popup.asp?url=/pdf_files/09006.pdf.  In Dean v. District of 
Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a decision denying a 
same-sex couple a marriage license.  Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 
(D.C. 1995).  The court found that the District of Columbia’s marriage statute did 
not include same-sex marriages despite being written to be gender-neutral, that 
denying the license did not violate the Human Rights Act, and that denying the 
license did not violate the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 309.  The Board found Dean 
instructive in that Dean clarified that a court must look to the legislative history, 
current statutory context, and legislative intent when determining whether a 
particular form of discrimination is proscribed by the HRA.  Marriage Initiative of 
2009, No. 09-006 11 at 10–11.  Unlike when Dean was decided, when the Board was 
deliberating, the Council had already enacted JAMA.  Therefore, it held that denying 
couples who fall within JAMA’s purview the same benefits afforded heterosexual 
married couples would contravene the HRA.  Id. 
 243  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 93. 
 244  Id. at 94. 
 245  Id. 
 246  Id. at 99. 
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because of the unique nature of D.C.’s governmental structure.247  
Moreover, as the District of Columbia is its own distinct jurisdiction, 
any comparison is merely instructive.  In the states, the people retain 
certain authority for themselves by granting power to the legislature 
through the ratification process.248  In the District of Columbia, 
however, Congress granted legislative authority to the Council, and, 
through the CAA, the Council has granted certain power to its 
residents.249  Essential to the court’s determination of whether the 
Human Rights Act Safeguard was a valid limitation on the people’s 
right to avail themselves of the initiative process was establishing the 
intent of the Council when enacting the CAA to share certain 
legislative power with the electorate.250 
Considering this question, the court focused on the legislative 
history of the HRA and, more specifically, on the District’s 
progressive tradition of being at the forefront of human rights and 
anti-discrimination legislation.251  A co-sponsor of the HRA, 
Councilmember Rolark, publicly testified about the importance of 
the HRA in light of the hard-fought battle for rights for all of the 
District’s citizens.252  Historically, the District of Columbia has housed 
a predominately minority population;253 the Council’s awareness of 
the significance of minority rights, or lack thereof, undoubtedly 
played a role in its deliberations.254 
The court found that the HRA Safeguard was not contrary to the 
purpose of the CAA,255 and that it would be inconceivable for the 
Council to adopt the CAA in a form that would allow the public to 
circumvent the HRA.256  Moreover, the court held that the Council 
had the authority to direct the Board to review the subject matter of a 
proposed initiative prior to an election to determine if the initiative 
addresses a proper subject matter.257  The court further agreed with 
 
 247  Id. at 101. 
 248  Id.  
 249  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 100–01. 
 250  Id. at 100. 
 251  Id. at 110. 
 252  Id.  
 253  See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA QUICKFACTS FROM THE 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states 
/11000.html.  While African-Americans comprise 12.6% of the U.S. population, 
African Americans make up 50.7% of the District of Columbia’s population.  Id.  
 254  See Jackson, 999 A.2d at 110. 
 255  Id. at 106. 
 256  Id. at 110. 
 257  Id. at 115. 
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the Board that the initiative would have the effect of discriminating 
based on sexual orientation.258  In so ruling, the court focused closely 
on the CAA’s legislative history.259  The Council’s Committee on 
Government Operations Report reveals the legislative intent behind 
the adoption of the CAA, noting that, “the initiative, referendum, 
and recall political processes are designed to provide direct and 
continual accountability of public officials to the electorate.”260  The 
court reasoned that if the broad purpose of the CAA is to provide for 
the accountability of the elected to the electorate, then the Council 
could reasonably have intended that this measure was necessary to 
fulfill that purpose: “the purpose of helping to ensure that the 
Council was accountable to the entire electorate.”261  The Council’s 
intention was to proscribe the use of the initiative “to enact 
legislation that would have the effect of discriminating against sectors 
of the electorate who might need protection” from threats of 
discrimination.262 
In affirming the district court’s ruling that the HRA safeguard in 
the IPA was consistent with the CAA’s intent, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals pointed to the Committee on Government Operations’ 
reliance on Supreme Court Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Reitman 
v. Mulkey.263  In Reitman, Justice Douglas responded to the argument 
that Proposition 14 represented the will of the people by quoting 
James Madison, who warned about the necessity of protecting 
minorities from the “acts in which the Government is the mere 
instrument of the major number of the Constituents.”264  Focusing on 
Madison’s teachings, Justice Douglas suggested that the will of the 
majority is not only an insufficient justification to condone a 
discriminatory policy, but that the will of the majority constitutes an 
especially powerful danger that can lead to oppression without 
proper resistance.265  To allow the will of the majority to oppress 
others in the community is tantamount to government-sanctioned 
discrimination.266  Therefore, the Committee on Government 
 
 258  Id. at 116. 
 259  D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS REPORT, B. 2-2, 2–3 (Mar. 16, 
1977) [hereinafter 2-2 Report] (on file with author). 
 260  Id. 
 261  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 105. 
 262  Id. 
 263  Id. at 105 n.27 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
concurring)). 
 264  Reitman, 387 U.S. at 387 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 265  Id. 
 266  See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9. 
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Operations concluded that “[t]he teaching of Reitman is that the 
initiative process may not be used to place the Government in the 
posture of affirmatively condoning discrimination.”267 
In summary, the court concluded that the Council did not 
contravene its authority under the CAA and the HRA when it 
adopted the Human Rights Safeguard of the IPA.268  Finding that the 
proposed Marriage Initiative Act of 2009 would authorize 
discrimination proscribed under the HRA, the appellate court agreed 
with the district court that the Board properly determined that the 
initiative was invalid.269 
The advantageous effects of the Human Rights Safeguard are 
evident in the Jackson decision.  Before one can assess whether the 
Human Rights Act Safeguard is a desirable component of the 
initiative process, it is instructive to first examine other regulatory 
methods that other jurisdictions currently use in the direct 
democracy process. 
IV.  CURRENT METHODS UTILIZED TO REGULATE DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
Jurisdictions across the nation employ various methods to 
regulate the direct democratic process, but no jurisdiction has a 
method as substantively comprehensive as the District of Columbia’s 
Human Rights Safeguard.270  This section will assess various measures 
that jurisdictions use to regulate the initiative process.  First, many 
jurisdictions implement pre-election legislative and administrative 
review of proposed initiatives.271  Some jurisdictions also use subject-
matter restrictions on the right to use the initiative as a means of 
regulating the content of proposed initiatives.272  Nevertheless, no 
other jurisdiction proscribes all initiatives infringing upon any 
human rights, as does the District of Columbia.273  Finally, this part 
will evaluate the efficacy of judicial review to temper the initiative 
process.  This section will not argue that current methods to regulate 
the initiative process are ill-founded.  Rather, this section will suggest 
that the current methods are insufficient to regulate the initiative 
 
 267  Id. 
 268  Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2001). 
 269  Id.; see generally Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, No. 2009 CA 008613 
B, 2010 WL 171913 (D.C. Super. Jan. 14, 2010).  
 270  See, e.g., infra text and notes accompanying Parts IV.A–C. 
 271  See, e.g., infra text and notes accompanying Part IV.A. 
 272  See infra text accompanying notes 291–97. 
 273  Id. 
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process to protect minority rights.  As such, further regulation is 
necessary.  To that end, the Human Rights Safeguard, though an 
outlier in practice, is a valuable reform measure that other 
jurisdictions ought to adopt to ensure that direct democracy does not 
lead to oppression by the many of the few.274 
A.  Pre-Election Legislative and Administrative Review 
State legislatures that have authorized an indirect initiative 
procedure generally hold hearings to discuss a proposal.275  This 
process serves as an opportunity to educate the legislators and public 
about the implications of adopting a proposal.276  California is the 
only state that uses a direct initiative that formally requires a 
legislative hearing, even though the legislature has no authority to 
change the proposed initiative.277  While informative, these hearings 
generally do not garner public or media attention.278  There are no 
studies that discuss the extent to which these hearings and 
subsequent reports are later used, but it does not appear that these 
hearings impact the overall discourse concerning the initiative 
process.279 
In most states, the official who conducts the pre-election 
administrative review of a proposal is not authorized to review its 
legality under state and federal law.280  The official merely reviews the 
initiative’s format and the sufficiency of the signature-gathering 
process.281  Seven states authorize regulatory oversight with greater 
review powers.282  None approach the breadth of the District of 
Columbia’s review to ensure that an initiative does not contravene 
the broad range of rights protected under the Human Rights Act.283  
 
 274  See generally 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9. 
 275  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 42; see supra Part II.A for a discussion on 
the difference between an indirect and a direct initiative.  While the indirect 
initiative must be submitted to the legislature for approval, a direct initiative is 
submitted directly to the electorate for approval or disapproval. 
 276  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 42. 
 277  Id. 
 278  Id. 
 279  Id. 
 280  Id. at 39. 
 281  Id.  
 282  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 39–40.  Alaska, Arkansas, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah authorize various methods of review that have 
more regulatory bite than the other states.  Id.  Additionally, seven jurisdictions, 
including the District of Columbia, provide for some form of drafting review.  Id. at 
42. 
 283  Id. at 39.   
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For instance, in Massachusetts, prior to a petition’s circulation, the 
Attorney General has the authority to preliminarily review a proposal 
to ensure that the measure does not include any matters that are 
excluded from the initiative process by the state’s constitution.284  
Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Attorney General is not authorized to 
review the constitutionality or validity of the proposal, but must 
certify only that the proposal facially conforms to the explicit 
requirements and subject-matter exclusions set forth in the state’s 
constitution even when there are other constitutionality concerns 
outside the precise restrictions on the initiative process.285  The 
exclusion of certain subjects restricts the right to utilize the initiative 
process, but is not nearly as all-encompassing as the Human Rights 
Safeguard.286  Specifically, the Attorney General will not certify a 
petition that relates to matters concerning the following: religion and 
religious institutions; judges and the court; local government; and 
specific appropriations of money.287  Accordingly, a petition related to 
the rights of gays and lesbians would not be precluded under the 
Massachusetts Constitution.288  Therefore, even if the Attorney 
General questioned the constitutionality of such a provision, the 
Attorney General would still be obligated to certify the petition if it 
conforms to the other requirements.289 
 
 
 
 284  Alexander Gray, Jr. & Thomas Kiley, The Initiative and Referendum in 
Massachusetts, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 27, 29 (1991); see MASS. CONST. amend. art. 
XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2.  While review of proposed initiatives is more comprehensive in 
Massachusetts than in most jurisdictions, Massachusetts does not proscribe a human 
rights violation in its initiative procedure.  Moreover, in Mississippi, the state 
department makes advisory recommendations regarding the language of the 
initiative, which the sponsor of the initiative can either accept or reject.  INITIATIVE 
AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESSES 8, 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%2
0Boxes/Requirements/A%20Comparison%20of%20Statewide%20I&R%20Processes
.pdf.  While twelve states require some form of pre-election review regarding 
language, content or constitutionality, in all but four of these states, the results of the 
review are advisory only.  Id. 
 285  Gray & Kiley, supra note 284, at 40–41; see MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, 
pt. 2, § 3 (outlines the criterion for the Attorney General’s certification). 
 286  See MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2. 
 287  Id. 
 288  See id. 
 289  Gray & Kiley, supra note 284, at 40–41; see MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, 
pt. 2, § 3 (outlining the criterion for the Attorney General’s certification). 
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B.  Subject-Matter Restrictions 
Most states’ initiative processes include some type of restriction 
on the use of the initiative.290  The most common restriction is the 
“single-subject rule,” which limits the subject matter of a proposal to 
one certain area of change.291  Similarly, four states enforce a waiting 
period for reintroducing a measure that previously failed.292  
Moreover, all states forbid an initiative to address an issue that is 
beyond the purview of the state legislature.293  Alaska, Massachusetts, 
and Wyoming prohibit initiatives creating courts or otherwise 
impacting the judicial process.294  In this regard, Mississippi and 
Massachusetts go further than other states in limiting initiatives.295  
Massachusetts excludes any initiative broaching religious issues, as 
well as initiatives limiting the right to free speech, to trial by jury, to 
just compensation for property takings, and to court access; 
Mississippi prohibits initiatives that would impact its state 
constitution’s Bill of Rights and right to work guarantee.296  Both 
Mississippi and Massachusetts prohibit an initiative that would change 
the initiative process itself.297  In sum, while states have implemented 
some limitations on the right to employ the initiative process, no state 
has a restriction that mirrors the District of Columbia’s Human 
Rights Safeguard.298 
C.  Judicial Review: A Crucial Component of the Initiative Process 
While courts play an important role in the effective functioning 
of the initiative process, the function of the courts proves insufficient 
in protecting the rights of minorities whose liberties are put to a 
majority vote.  Generally, the courts become engaged in the initiative 
process only after a majority of voters have approved an initiative, as 
the courts must interpret and enforce initiatives that the jurisdiction’s 
electorate has approved.299  Courts generally are reluctant to review 
 
 290  See text accompanying notes 270–72. 
 291  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 81. 
 292  Id. at 82. 
 293  INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, supra note 284, at 13.  
 294  Id. 
 295  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 82. 
 296  Id.; see MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. 15, §273(5). 
 297  Id. 
 298  See supra text accompanying notes 201–27. 
 299  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43.  Additionally, courts are sometimes 
called upon to determine whether the procedural requirements for submission or 
adoption have been satisfied, whether the initiative falls within the jurisdiction’s 
specified subject-matter limitations, see supra text accompanying notes 291–98 or 
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substantive constitutional challenges prior to election.300  There also is 
concern that pre-election judicial review can slow down the initiative 
process and place the judiciary in the middle of a contentious 
political debate.301  Nevertheless, one could argue that pre-election 
judicial review is more efficient, as resources and energies could be 
reserved at the front end of the process, before any campaign or vote 
ever takes place.302  Furthermore, many scholars argue for broader 
judicial scrutiny, because the traditional vetting and deliberation 
process inherent in the legislative process is generally absent in the 
direct initiative process.303 
Most jurisdictions allow pre-election judicial review concerning 
issues of procedural compliance, while about half of jurisdictions 
allow pre-election judicial review for questions about whether the 
subject matter of a proposal complies with subject-matter 
restrictions.304  Still, as courts generally are reluctant to review 
questions of constitutionality prior to an initiative’s placement on the 
ballot,305 ballot measures implicating the rights of minorities will 
routinely go on the ballot without review by the judiciary.306  Legal 
scholar and former jurist Hans Linde warns of the increased 
likelihood of direct initiatives “to enact ordinary laws . . . in the form 
of constitutional text so as to insulate a law from change by elected 
lawmakers as well as from review of its constitutionality.”307  Most 
scholars agree that direct initiatives ought not to be insulated from 
 
whether the initiative is valid under the federal or state constitutions.  DUBOIS & 
FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43.   
 300  Id. 
 301  Id.  Because a majority of jurisdictions require that a statewide initiative be 
placed on the general election ballot, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, supra 
note 284, at 22, pre-election judicial review has the potential to delay the 
consideration of an initiative depending on the point at which the initiative is 
considered in the election cycle and exacerbate timing issues. 
 302  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43. 
 303  Ronald Steiner, Understanding the Prop 8 Litigation: The Scope of Direct Democracy 
and Role of Judicial Scrutiny, 14 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 81, 82 (2009). 
 304  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 43. 
 305  Id. 
 306  For the purposes of further explaining the deficiencies of the current practice 
of judicial review, it is important to note that prior to the approval of Proposition 8, 
the petitioners in the case of Strauss v. Horton sought a stay of the initiative or, in the 
alternative, injunctive relief pending judicial review in November 2008.  See Strauss v. 
Horton, No. S168047, 2008 WL 5516861, at *2, *7 (Cal. Nov. 7, 2008).  Nevertheless, 
the Court did not issue a decision as to the validity of Proposition 8 until May 2009, 
after the approval by a majority of voters on November 4, 2008.  Strauss v. Horton, 
207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009). 
 307  Hans Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 
709, 710 (1994). 
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scrutiny and that courts should inspect ballot initiatives with greater 
vigor than ordinary legislative measures.308  Without change or other 
safeguards, such as the Human Rights Safeguard, the will of the 
majority remains a threat to minority interests. 
Moreover, even when ballot measures are ultimately reviewed, 
the courts apply inconsistent standards of review.309  Scholars 
complain about the divergent manner in which courts review ballot 
measures.310  Federal and state courts, for example, use varying 
standards.311  Furthermore, while some courts apply a more 
deferential standard of review, reasoning that a direct initiative comes 
directly from the people, other courts apply a stricter level of 
scrutiny.312  To combat the harmful majoritarianism that initiatives 
pose, scholars argue that courts should preemptively and stringently 
enforce constitutional protections and technical requirements.313 
Because the structural protections of checks and balances inherent in 
the ordinary legislative process are absent in the direct initiative 
process,314 compelling reasons exist for stricter review of direct 
initiatives. 
V.  THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PRE-ELECTION REVIEW AND JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT SAFEGUARD AS A MODEL FOR 
REFORM 
As current and customary methods used to regulate the direct 
initiative process reveal, the Human Rights Safeguard is an outlier 
and is otherwise unprecedented in every other jurisdiction in this 
country.315  Nevertheless, while unique in practice, the Human Rights 
Safeguard embodies an essential tool to mitigate the threat of 
oppression.  Other jurisdictions ought to follow the District of 
Columbia and adopt similar reforms. 
A.  A Political Philosophical Justification for Reform 
Regulating direct democracy poses a particular challenge 
precisely because it is antithetical to the American form of 
 
 308  Steiner, supra note 303, at 90. 
 309  See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1. 
 310  MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 27. 
 311  Id. 
 312  Id. 
 313  Adams, supra note 93, at 628. 
 314  Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 296.  
 315  See supra Parts IV.A–C. 
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government.316  As Erwin Chemerinsky notes, the structure of the 
United States Constitution is largely guided by distrust of majorities.317  
The debate about the power that the people should properly hold in 
a modern democracy is as old as government itself.318  Scholars and 
leaders have struggled to find a balance between self-government and 
fair and equal representation of all of society’s voices.319  Thomas 
Jefferson, whose philosophy many proponents of direct democracy 
revere, proposed the ideology that government is invalid unless 
founded upon the will of the people.320  Town hall-style government, 
under which everyone gathers to discuss and debate policy, while 
perhaps ideal, certainly is impractical in an expansive and diverse 
nation: “In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is 
impossible that the whole should assemble to make laws.”321 
Political thinkers have long posited theories cautioning against 
the government by the will of majority factions.322  While a 
government may well be founded upon the will of the people, the 
government also must be constructed to rein in that will when 
necessary and appropriate.  James Madison, architect of the United 
States Constitution, warned of the need for establishing checks and 
balances to protect the governed from the proclivities of human 
nature: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary.”323  Eschewing the notion of true 
direct democracy, Madison and his peers determined that, while 
elected representatives should be sensitive to the governed, regular 
elections served as a sufficient measure to ensure that officials were 
attuned to the wishes of the people, and, accordingly, America would 
function under a republican democracy.324  The founders structured a 
representative democracy devoid of a national right to create laws via 
popular initiative.325 
 
 316  Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 294.   
 317  Id. at 295.   
 318  Id. 
 319  See CRONIN, supra note 24, at 18–20. 
 320  Id. at 40. 
 321  John Adams, quoted in CRONIN, supra note 24, at 14 (discussing John Adams, 
Thoughts on Government (1776)). 
 322  See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 296.  Chemerinsky argues that the 
framers’ support of representative democracy did not result from elitism, but from 
the framers’ study of history and of their well-founded fear of the tyranny of 
consolidated power in government.  Id. at 295. 
 323  THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
 324  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 8. 
 325  Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 295.  Chemerinsky also notes that the framers 
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The founders’ wariness of direct democracy stemmed from their 
fear of the tyranny of the majority, especially in regard to minority 
rights oppressed by the will and fancy of the politically powerful.326  A 
healthy fear of tyranny of the majority has remained a constant 
consideration from America’s beginning and certainly remains 
today.327  From the founding of this nation, the pervasive struggle to 
find the proper balance between effective government and individual 
rights and liberties has plagued both the governors and the 
governed.328  Ultimately, the framers drafted the Constitution to 
ensure that no institution could assume a concentration of power by 
“(i) investing primary lawmaking authority in representatives rather 
than the people themselves; (ii) dividing the power of the lawmakers 
so that each unit may check the others; and (iii) placing certain 
principles beyond the reach of ordinary majorities.”329  Direct 
democratic procedures, such as the direct ballot initiative, serve to 
break down this wall, allowing ordinary majorities to affect principles 
not otherwise alterable by popular will.330 
While the framers of the Constitution purposefully created an 
indirect democracy—a republican democracy—the use of, and 
campaign for, direct democracy dates back to the English settlers.331  
This campaign has resurfaced throughout American history, as seen 
in the Populist and Progressive Movements, and again in the 1970s 
through today.332  While this nation has progressed from an emerging 
republic to an established and powerful democracy, jurisdictions 
utilizing direct democracy would be well advised not to forget the 
lessons of the founding fathers.  Casting aside the founders’ 
experience risks violence to the liberties upon which this country was 
established. 
As Magleby notes, the issue of checks and balances in direct 
democratic processes is particularly important when dealing with 
measures targeting minority groups.333  By the very nature of direct 
legislation, campaigns “appeal to passions and prejudices, spotlight 
 
would have strongly condemned a national plebiscite and that direct democracy is 
inconsistent with the structure and philosophy of the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 294–
95. 
 326  See CRONIN, supra note 24, at 19. 
 327  Id. at 90. 
 328  See id. at 21. 
 329  Eule, supra note 22, at 1549. 
 330  See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 3. 
 331  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 1. 
 332  See supra Parts II.B–C.  
 333  Magleby, supra note 6, at 45. 
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tensions, and may foster even greater conflict and disagreement.”334  
While there has always existed a tension between the will of the 
electorate and the potential for tyranny and oppression, political 
leaders and thinkers historically have tempered this tension through 
representative governmental structures.335  The introduction of direct 
democratic practices, as has been established, has reinforced this 
persistent tension, and therefore is more properly addressed through 
regulatory reform. 
B.  Initiatives Addressing Same-Sex Marriage: A Compelling Argument 
for Reform 
Professor Adam Morse proposes that “initiatives addressing 
same-sex marriage provide an ideal case study for balancing the 
political rights of minority groups with those of the majority.”336  
Ballot initiatives aimed at defining marriage as between opposite-sex 
couples have the effect of rendering gays and lesbians second-class 
citizens, and raise serious questions about the rights of political 
participation in the United States.337  A significant issue that remains 
unaddressed is whether gays and lesbians fall precisely within the 
suspect classification characterized in footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Company: “whether prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”338  Nevertheless, 
 
 334  Id. at 44.  
 335  See generally CRONIN, supra note 24, at 8–9. 
 336  Morse, supra note 7, at 963. 
 337  Id. 
 338  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  The 
debate about whether gays and lesbians qualify as a suspect class highlights the fact 
that the legal status of this group is in flux.  Many current court decisions and 
political and scholarly debates focus on the issue of the legal protections gays and 
lesbians should be afforded.  Such discussions will not be examined in detail, but it is 
nonetheless important to highlight the current uncertainty surrounding this ongoing 
debate.  See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); 
see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (finding a state constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage under the equal protection clause); Kerrigan v. Comm’r 
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney 
General, the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011 
/February/11-ag-223.html  [hereinafter “Holder Letter”].  The Attorney General 
Eric Holder notified the House Speaker John Boehner that sexual orientation 
should receive heightened scrutiny, and therefore declared his opinion that the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional as applied to legally married 
same-sex couples.  He further stated that Section 3 of DOMA violates the equal 
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initiatives addressing same-sex marriage raise critical concerns 
regarding the interplay between minority and majority political rights 
in part because gays and lesbians are a minority group that the 
federal courts have yet to identify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.339 
The initiative process allows individuals harboring “animus 
towards disempowered minorities to make careless and unexamined 
decisions without ever enduring a sustained confrontation with the 
individuals who stand to lose a great deal as a direct result of their 
voting decisions.”340  Any philosophical rationale for giving deference 
to ballot initiatives targeting vulnerable minorities seems 
constitutionally unwarranted, and appears contrary to the original 
intellectual justifications for the process of direct democracy.341  
Proponents of such measures frequently supply misinformation, 
which offsets any educative advantage of direct democracy.342  The use 
of these proposals does not merely provide an alternative to the 
republican democracy, but can supplant it by weakening the power of 
elected officials to consider these issues.343  Furthermore, the use of 
initiatives in this area “demonstrate[s] the problems of permitting 
voters to contemplate complex, emotionally charged issues.”344  
Without proper checks and balances, the majority can, will, and 
already has subjugated minority rights through the use of ballot 
initiatives.345  The town hall ideal does not accurately reflect reality, 
and without proper limitations, direct democracy threatens the 
balance that the founders deliberately wove into the Constitution. 
C.  Judicial Review as a Necessary but Insufficient Safeguard Against 
Discrimination 
Responding to the criticism that initiatives lead to a tyranny of 
the majority, scholar David D. Schmidt argues that lawmaking by 
popular vote cannot lead to such tyranny in part because 
constitutional initiatives are subject to federal judicial review and 
 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.  Further, the Attorney General 
invited the Speaker to defend the constitutionality of DOMA because the President 
and his administration could not and would not defend DOMA.  The importance of 
this letter cannot be understated. 
 339  Morse, supra note 7, at 963. 
 340  Smith, supra note 17, at 545.  
 341  Adams, supra note 93, at 601. 
 342  Id. at 602. 
 343  Id. 
 344  Id. 
 345  See supra text accompanying notes 97–117. 
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therefore must conform to the United States Constitution.346  
Nevertheless, same-sex couples continue to be the target of successful 
initiative campaigns throughout the country and judicial review has 
not proven to be a sufficient safeguard.347  Until recently, gays and 
lesbians have not been deemed to be a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class.348  Accordingly, judicial review of ballot measures is simply an 
insufficient safeguard in all cases.349 
Eule argues that the judiciary must play a larger role in reviewing 
measures adopted by initiative because of the absence of the filtering 
system inherent in representative democracy; consequently, “the 
judiciary stands alone in guarding against the evils incident to 
transient, impassioned majorities that the Constitution seeks to 
dissipate.”350  Eule further proposes that where the people choose to 
eschew representation, as with the use of the direct initiative, the 
courts must step in to “protect the Constitution’s representational 
values.”351  Under Eule’s reasoning, the courts should be suspicious of 
and strictly scrutinize plebiscites that concern individual rights and 
equal treatment under the law.352 
Nonetheless, some argue that the judiciary, deferential to 
methods of direct democracy such as the ballot initiative, is 
insufficient in fully protecting minority rights from majority political 
action.353  Moreover, empirical research suggests that both state and 
federal courts are inconsistent in their approach to judicial review of 
ballot initiatives.354  While some courts apply a strict standard, others 
are more deferential to the initiatives.355  This concern is 
compounded by the problem of federal courts sometimes applying 
different standards than state courts.356  Therefore, greater uniformity 
in judicial review on the state and federal level is necessary to protect 
 
 346  SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 37.   
 347  See Ballotwatch, Election 2009, supra note 129; Sharples, supra note 122. 
 348  See Holder Letter, supra note 338. 
 349  This argument is not to suggest that judicial review is never sufficient to 
protect minority interests.  As is evident in the case of Reitman v. Mulkey, for instance, 
the judiciary can serve as a watchdog for minority rights.  Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369, 378 (1967).  Instead, I argue that because of inconstant standards of review 
and the unpredictable application of the rational basis standard, the judiciary is an 
insufficient safeguard.   
 350  Eule, supra note 22, at 1525. 
 351  Id. at 1559. 
 352  Id.  
 353  See Gamble, supra note 115, at 262. 
 354  MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 27. 
 355  Id. 
 356  Id.  
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minorities from majority political action.  Without proper review and 
in the absence of safeguards, minorities remain vulnerable. 
Moreover, while courts may strike down a measure affirmatively 
promoting discrimination, the direct repeal of preexisting legal 
protections may not trigger judicial intervention.357  For example, in 
the District of Columbia, the legislative history of the IPA reveals that 
the Council was concerned that, in light of the Reitman holding, “the 
mere repeal of an anti-discrimination statute might not be sufficient 
to warrant judicial intervention.”358  While the distinction is nuanced, 
it is also significant.  Courts are more likely to strike down a ballot 
initiative that imposes a policy of discrimination than one that repeals 
an anti-discrimination civil rights protection that the legislature 
previously enacted.359  While courts likely will strike down 
government-sanctioned discrimination, they may not nullify a 
measure that “merely” repeals protections that the legislature 
deemed necessary, so long as the initiative does not explicitly 
promote discrimination. 
Furthermore, one scholar has warned that so-called “initiative 
elites,” a term used to identify individuals who are believed to have 
professionalized the initiative process, have become frustrated with 
the courts’ inconsistent and intervening role in the direct democratic 
process.360  As Professor Matthew Manweller warns, if the courts serve 
as the sole mechanism charged with the duty to maintain “Madison’s 
system of minority protections,” they will frequently have to strike 
down measures, ultimately leading to resistance.361  Initiative elites 
respond to the courts’ involvement in the initiative process in order 
to protect their continued reliance on the autonomy of the process.362  
Moreover, initiative elites have become increasingly frustrated and 
openly hostile to the courts.363  The initiative elites have pursued two 
different courses of action to adapt to judicial intervention and 
nullification: first, they have utilized the initiative process to restrict 
the role of the judiciary in the process;364 second, they have attacked 
 
 357  Gamble, supra note 115, at 262. 
 358  2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9; see also Gamble, supra note 115, at 262. 
 359  Gamble, supra note 115, at 262. 
 360  MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 209. 
 361  Id. at 209–10. 
 362  Id. 
 363  Id. at 194. 
 364  Id.  For example, activist Don McIntire of Oregon drafted and qualified for 
the 2002 ballot Measure 21 and 22, both as a result of what the sponsor believed to 
be a too activist court.  Measure 21 would have required that, in any judicial election, 
an option of “None of the Above” must be listed on the ballot.  If this option received 
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the judiciary through the use of the recall or other tactics such as 
influencing judicial election campaigns to unseat jurists.365  For 
instance, the recall of three Iowa Supreme Court justices after the 
court’s unanimous decision legalizing same-sex marriage is a 
testament to this argument.366  Initiative elites also might bear the 
burden of information costs in a judicial election in order to inform 
the public about a decision of a particular jurist, either by drafting 
candidates or by providing opposition research.367 
The initiative elites’ reactionary behavior likely will result in a 
more politicized court and less confidence in the judiciary’s 
impartiality and accountability.368  While further discussion of this 
potential phenomenon’s impact on the courts is beyond the scope of 
this Comment, it is important to note that additional safeguards, such 
as the Human Rights Safeguard, are essential to the protection of 
minority rights in part because the courts are an insufficient 
watchdog in the face of the ever-increasing use of ballot initiatives to 
govern in the name of moral supremacy. 
D.  The Time for Reform 
Nineteen of the twenty-five jurisdictions with an initiative 
procedure in place adopted the initiative before 1919.369  Since that 
time, “there has been relatively little systematic review of the initiative 
procedure.”370  While most states have kept their initiative procedures 
in roughly the same form as when first adopted, the world has 
changed considerably since then.371  We undoubtedly still live in an 
“era of real grievances.”372  Nevertheless, the issues of the day during 
the Progressive years, social ills arising due to modernization and an 
increased presence of government in one’s everyday life, are not the 
same as many of today’s concerns, particularly the “family values” 
 
more votes than any judge listed, a special election would be held.  Id. at 204–05.  
Even though this measure failed, such a measure may influence a judge the next 
time he or she is presented with a challenged ballot initiative on the docket.  Id. at 
209. 
 365  MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 194–95.  Manweller notes that initiative elites 
can do little to respond to federal courts that nullify initiatives, as federal judges are 
appointed for life and are therefore largely insulated from political pressures.  Id. at 
196. 
 366  See Sulzberger, supra note 43. 
 367  MANWELLER, supra note 62, at 198–99, 209. 
 368  Id. at 210–11; see Sulzberger, supra note 43.  
 369  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 56, at 232–33. 
 370  Id. 
 371  Id. at 233. 
 372  CRONIN, supra note 24, at 6. 
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issues typically targeted in modern ballot initiative campaigns. 
Although states adopted initiative processes to combat powerful 
political machinery and special interests and to ensure state 
legislatures’ responsiveness to those they represent, in Strauss v. 
Horton Justice Moreno found no evidence that the Progressives 
intended to preclude the protection of vulnerable minorities from 
the will of the majority.373  There is a stark difference between 
protecting against politically powerful minority groups and allowing 
the majoritarian process to impede the rights of disfavored and 
politically powerless minorities.374 
Yet, it is true that direct democracy is not purely a source of 
oppression.  The initiative has been and can continue to be a source 
of positive political reform.  For instance, women’s suffrage was a 
target of early state initiatives.375  Moreover, in Maryland and Maine, 
ballot initiatives legalizing same-sex were passed by the majority of 
voters in the 2012 election.376  But, despite the benefits that direct 
democracy provides, the initiative process continues to pose a serious 
risk to minority groups.377  While some may argue that the mere act of 
allowing civil rights to be put to a popular vote sharpens divisions in 
society,378 ballot initiatives are a reality and the ever-increasing 
utilization of ballot initiatives emphasizes the need for reform to 
ensure that ballot initiatives do not strip away the rights of vulnerable 
minorities.379 
 
 373  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 133 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 374  See id. 
 375  Magleby, supra note 6, at 45. 
 376  Election 2012: Same-Sex Marriage Passes in Maryland, Main, CNN WIRE (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/national/election-2012-same-sex-marriage 
-passes-in-maryland-maine. 
 377  Adams, supra note 93, at 603. 
 378  See Gamble, supra note 115, at 262. 
 379  For instance, as briefly discussed above, supra note 38, the authorization of 
same-sex marriage, whether by legislative initiative or popular referendum, is a 
controversial issue currently facing citizens and government officials in New Jersey.  
Around the time of this writing, the New Jersey State Legislature passed legislation 
authorizing gay marriage, while New Jersey Governor Chris Christie has vetoed any 
such legislation.  Kate Fernike, Christie Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion 
/christie-vetoes-gay-marriage-bill.html.  Instead, the Governor proposed to put the 
question to the voters as a popular referendum, publicly stating: “this is not an issue 
that should rest solely in the hands of the Senate, or in the hands of the Speaker [of 
the New Jersey General Assembly] or the other 118 members of the Legislature.  
Let’s let the people of New Jersey decide what is right for the state.”  Transcript: Gov. 
Christie Speaks in Bridgewater on Gay Marriage, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Jan. 24, 2012, 
available at http://www.app.com/article/20120124/NJNEWS10/301240066 
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/TRANSCRIPT-Gov-Christie-speaks-Bridgewater-gay-marriage.  The Governor also 
indicated a belief that “if New Jersey is seriously looking to overturn hundreds of 
years of societal, legal and religious tradition, we need to give this issue the weight it 
merits” by “giving New Jerseyans the ability to give voice to the support or opposition 
of this measure.”  Id.  The Governor caused some controversy among civil rights 
leaders when he indicated at a press conference that, “[p]eople would have been 
happy to have a referendum on civil rights rather than fighting and dying in the 
streets in the South.”  Matt Katz, Christie Calls for Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://articles.philly.com/2012-01-
25/news/30663269_1_gay-marriage-bill-marriage-referendum-marriage-equality/3.   
Currently pending in the New Jersey Legislature is a concurrent resolution: the 
constitutionally prescribed mechanism for placing public questions on the ballot at a 
general election, amending the state constitution to define “marriage” as “the legally 
recognized union of two persons of any gender.”  SCR-88, 215th Sen. (N.J. 2012).  
The current situation in New Jersey represents a somewhat unusual twist on the facts 
surrounding the public initiatives discussed elsewhere in this Comment.  There are 
mixed views among proponents as to whether to proceed with the referendum.  
Governor Christie opposes same-sex marriage, but has indicated he would accept the 
results of any public referendum on the topic, while a majority of the Legislature, but 
not a veto-proof majority, support same-sex marriage, but not a public referendum.  
Katz, supra  (noting that Senate President Stephen Sweeney announced that “[c]ivil 
rights will not be placed on the ballot”).  Moreover, the public initiative is phrased as 
an expansion, rather than a reduction, of the currently existing rights of same-sex 
couples in contrast to the circumstances in California and Colorado, for example.  
Though anomalous in this regard, Governor Christie’s attempt to circumvent the 
legislature emphasizes the conflict between minority rights and direct democracy 
and suggests that direct democratic processes must be restrained. 
The debate over same-sex marriage and the use of direct democratic processes is 
not limited to New Jersey.  On February 13, 2012, Washington Governor Chris 
Gregoire signed into law a measure that would legalize same-sex marriage.  
Washington Gov Signs Gay Marriage Bill into Law, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2012, available at  
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-13/washington-state-gay-
marriage-law/53079236/1.  The law would not take effect until June 7, 2012, and 
soon after Governor Gregoire signed the measure into law, opponents of same-sex 
marriage were preparing to challenge the measure, including a ballot initiative to be 
proposed for the November 2012 election that would require voters to either 
approve or overturn the new measure.  Id.  Washington voters ultimately voted to 
uphold the law allowing for same-sex marriage.  Same-Sex Marriage Wins on the Ballot 
for the First Time in American History, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 7, 2012, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/11/same-sex-marriage-wins-on-the-
ballot-for-the-first-time-in-american-history/264704/.  In early 2012 in Maryland, the 
state legislature’s House Judiciary and Health and Government Operations 
Committees conducted hearings on a bill that would legalize same-sex marriage.  Md. 
Advocates Pack Gay Marriage Hearing, Delegate Says Child Abuse Attempt Formed his View, 
ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
house-panels-to-hear-gay-marriage-arguments-committees-will-consider-dueling 
-bills/2012/02/10/gIQAt6Y02Q_story.html.  Opponents of same-sex marriage 
threatened to challenge the measure, if passed, via a 2012 general election 
referendum.  Id.  The law passed, and Maryland voters ultimately upheld the law by 
voting against a ballot measure in opposition to the law in the November 2012 
election.  John Wagner, Paul Schwartzman, & Ned Martel, Maryland Approves Same-Sex 
Marriage Law, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-
11-07/local/35505987_1_marriage-law-marriage-measure-maryland-and-maine. 
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E.  States Should Adopt Reforms Mirroring the District of Columbia’s 
Human Rights Safeguard 
Just as the District of Columbia Council was attuned to the 
events at the time of the enactment of the Safeguard, so too should 
states recognize that the initiative is sometimes used today to target 
politically vulnerable minorities.  As contemporaneous events 
afforded the District of Columbia Council good reason “to anticipate 
that an initiative or referendum that would have the effect of 
authorizing discrimination could be a threat to the peace and to life 
and limb,”380 modern state governments ought to take notice of the 
District of Columbia’s experience and recognize that ballot initiatives 
are being used, not to achieve social progress, but to target minority 
rights.  The District of Columbia’s continuous prioritization of 
protecting minority rights is evidenced by the District having the 
most stringent subject-matter limitation on the right to utilize the 
initiative process.  Moreover, the Council’s focus on the Reitman 
decision is persuasive.  The Human Rights Safeguard ensures that 
citizens cannot use the initiative to strip a government of “neutrality 
toward protected minority classifications.”381  Without a safeguard, a 
majority of the electorate can use the ballot initiative to put the 
government in a position of sanctioning discrimination. 
By focusing on particular constitutionally defined rights or 
provisions as opposed to the government’s sanctioning of 
discrimination, there may always remain a segment of the population 
unprotected by the will of the majority.  The Human Rights 
Safeguard provides a strong, preemptive check on potentially 
threatening majoritarian politics.  The courts play an integral role in 
the direct democratic process and in the protection of minority 
rights, but the Human Rights Safeguard ensures that the fate of 
minority rights are not left to judicial intervention. 
The Populists and Progressives originally promoted the initiative 
as a means of making the elected accountable to the electorate; 
 
Meanwhile, voters approved a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage 
in North Carolina in May 2012.  David Zucchino, North Carolina Passes Ban on Gay 
Marriage, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may 
/09/nation/la-na-gay-marriage-20120509.  Minnesota voters also defeated a measure 
that would have allowed for same-sex marriage in November, 2012.  Debbi Wilgoren, 
Minnesota Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/11/07/minnesota 
-voters-reject-same-sex-marriage-ban/. 
 380  Jackson v. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 112 n.44 (D.C. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
 381  See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9. 
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similarly, the broad purpose of the CAA was to provide accountability 
of the elected to the electorate.382  The entire electorate means just 
that—if certain minority segments of a community can be targeted by 
others, the initiative process cannot serve its intended purpose.  By 
allowing the Board to reject any initiative that would place the 
District in the posture of condoning discrimination,383 the District’s 
citizens can use the initiative process to hold their government 
accountable and promote policy change while promoting 
accountability to the entire electorate.  The Human Rights Safeguard, 
therefore, supplements judicial intervention, allows for direct 
democratic methods to affect social change, and ensures that 
politically powerful majorities cannot limit minority rights through 
ballot initiatives. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without 
which it instantly expires.  But it could not be a less folly to 
abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it 
nourishes faction that it would be to wish annihilation of 
air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to its 
destructive agency.384 
Liberty must be moderated.  As Gamble has aptly concluded, 
how a society treats a “threat to political minorities is one of the most 
volatile issues a society can face.”385  The way a society treats its most 
vulnerable is a testament to the value that society places on humanity, 
democracy, and liberty.  And while the process of direct democracy 
may have its place in a representative democracy, direct democracy 
must be tempered by justice. 
The initiative remains popular in this country, and as current 
trends seem to indicate,386 direct democratic processes are prevalently 
used to legislate minority rights and civil liberties.  Furthermore, it is 
more likely that additional states will adopt initiative procedures than 
it is that any state will repeal them.387  The increasing popularity of 
the initiative suggests the need for immediate reform.  Absent the 
checks that representative democracy provides, minorities cannot be 
 
 382  Jackson, 999 A.2d at 105. 
 383  See 2-317 Report, supra note 205, at 9. 
 384  Smith, supra note 17, at 563. 
 385  Gamble, supra note 115, at 262. 
 386  See, e.g., supra note 379. 
 387  Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing by Initiative: Structuring the Ballot 
Initiative: Procedures That do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 56 (1995). 
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protected without adequate safeguards, and the threat to vulnerable 
minority groups will become more pervasive without action to reform 
initiative procedures to account for the direct threat to minority 
rights. 
Jurisdictions ought to adopt the Human Rights Safeguard, as 
exemplified in the District of Columbia.  Keeping human rights off of 
the ballot and out of the reach of majoritarian politics is essential to 
the promise of liberty upon which this county is founded.  Moreover, 
the Human Rights Safeguard reform can preserve the attributes of 
direct democracy, allowing the electorate a voice to participate in 
governance and to hold elected officials accountable.  Further, with 
such a reform, courts will not be the only shield against human rights 
violations by initiative, and the rights of vulnerable minorities will 
thereby be protected.  
 
